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This article aims to investigate the phase-locking and switching volatility in the idiosyncratic risk 
factor of hedge funds using switching regime beta models. This approach allows the analysis of hedge 
fund tail event behavior and in particular the changes in hedge fund exposure to various risk factors 
potentially related to liquidity risk, conditional on different states of the market. We and that in a 
normal state of the market, the exposure to risk factors could be very low but as soon as the market 
risk factor captured by the S&P500 moves to a down-market state characterized by negative returns 
and high volatility, the exposure of hedge fund indexes to the S&P500 and especially to other risk 
factors changes signiﬁcantly presenting evidence of phase-locking. We further extend the regime 
switching model to allow for non-linearity in residuals and show that switching regime models are 
able to capture and forecast the evolution of the idiosyncratic risk factor in terms of changes from a 
low volatility regime to a distressed state that are not directly related to market risk factors. 
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The last decade has seen an increase in the number of hedge funds and availability of hedge
fund data both on individual hedge funds and on hedge fund indexes. Unlike mutual funds,
hedge funds engage in dynamic strategies, use leverage, employ derivatives and have non-
linear payoﬀs. Further, hedge funds are known for their “opportunistic” nature of trading
and a signiﬁcant part of their returns arise from taking state-contingent bets.
Along with spectacular returns, hedge funds have experienced colossal losses: Long Term
Capital Management hedge fund and other Fixed Income strategy funds in 1998, Long/Short
Equity and Global Macro strategies in 2002, losses in the Convertible Bond Arbitrage strat-
egy in 2005 and the collapse of Amaranth Multi-Strategy hedge fund in September 2006.
All these losses were sudden, unanticipated events characterized by low probability. Chan
Getmansky, Haas and Lo (2005) describe this phenomenon as phase locking1. Due to the
phase-locking phenomenon, correlations between hedge funds and markets change, making
mean-variance allocations sub-optimal in crises conditions.
In this paper we show that this characteristic behavior for hedge funds cannot be ex-
plained by standard linear factor models. We demonstrate how a switching regime beta
approach, that accounts for “short-lived” and “infrequent” events, can accurately capture
non-linear exposure of hedge funds to various factors, and speciﬁcally, to precisely estimate
tail risk exposure. Switching regime beta models are able to capture changes in market
volatilities in diﬀerent states as well as phase-locking phenomenon (i.e., a sudden change in
correlations between hedge funds and risk factors). Forbes and Rigobon (2002) ﬁnd that
cross-market correlations are biased if not adjusted for switching market volatility. There-
fore, hedge fund exposures will be biased if not corrected for switching market volatilities.
Moreover, the use of regime-switching models of hedge funds is appropriate as many hedge
funds implement regime-switching strategies. For example, a long-short strategy hedge fund
is more likely to be long equity during up-markets and short equity during down-markets
(Alexander and Dimitriu (2005)). Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel and Welch (2006) describe
that hedge funds game their strategies according to past returns by using leverage and
options. Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) show that merger (risk) arbitrage managers generate
returns that resemble a short put, short call payoﬀ. Agarwal and Naik (2000a, 2004) show
that returns for several hedge fund strategies resemble option payoﬀs (on both calls and
puts). Goetzmann et al. (2006) ﬁnd that “dynamic manipulation taken in order to inﬂuence
returns, induces time variation into the return distribution”. Therefore, it is important
1“Phase-locking” behavior is borrowed from natural sciences, where otherwise uncorrelated actions sud-
denly become synchronized.
2to consider diﬀerent factor loadings for hedge fund strategies during diﬀerent regimes of
a market. The authors ﬁnd that the relationship between the Sharpe ratio or portfolio
return and underlying market return has a natural logarithm function2, i.e., Sharpe ratio
and portfolio return are bounded above and have an inﬁnite left tail. They ﬁnd that the
optimal strategy for hedge funds might be selling out-of-the-money puts and calls, ensuring
that during normal and up markets, hedge fund managers obtain a positive cash ﬂow, and
have a large exposure in extreme negative events. Therefore, hedge fund factor exposure
is time-varying and should be estimated with regime-switching model with three regimes
(up-market, down-market and normal).
It is important to understand and model time-varying risk exposures, considering switch-
ing volatility in the market, for various strategies. Moreover, it is imperative to obtain reli-
able estimates for predicted exposures of hedge fund returns to various market risk factors
in diﬀerent market volatility regimes and potential exposure to latent variables. There is
still a limited understanding of the real non-linear exposure to risk factors of the diﬀerent
hedge funds strategies and the role played by liquidity risk. In this paper, in line with the
asset pricing perspective proposed by Bekaert and Harvey (1995), we analyze the exposure
of hedge fund indexes with a factor model based on regime switching, where non-linearity in
the exposure is captured by factor loadings that are state dependent. Our approach is able
to capture the switching volatility of market risk factor and characterize its returns by three
diﬀerent regimes: normal, down-market and up-market.3 The state dependent factor load-
ings are able to capture the exposure of the hedge fund to the risk factors in these diﬀerent
states. Our factor loadings estimates are unbiased as the approach takes into consideration
volatility switching in the market risk factor (as suggested by Forges and Rigobon (2002)).
As we show in the paper, the use of beta switching regime models allows us to capture
and analyze phase-locking, hedge fund tail behavior and switching volatility of the idiosyn-
cratic risk factor. More speciﬁcally, with our analysis we uncover ﬁve main phenomena with
corresponding results.
First, our investigation of the S&P returns endogenously highlights three S&P regimes
(or states): a regime characterized by both high S&P 500 returns and low S&P 500 volatility
that we call the “up-market”, a regime with low S&P 500 expected returns and high S&P
500 volatility (“down-market”) and a “normal (middle)” regime characterized by “middle”
2The maximal Sharpe ratio return has a lognormal distribution bounded above and with an inﬁnite left
tail. Return is assumed to be lognormally distributed (Goetzmann et al. (2006)).
3Our deﬁnition of up-market and down-market is a deﬁnition encompassing both means and standard
deviations. It should not be confused with notation used by Mathur, Pettengill and Sundaram (1995), where
up-market and down-market are deﬁned as positive and negative, respectively, realizations of the diﬀerence
between realized market return and risk free rate.
3expected S&P 500 mean and “middle” S&P 500 volatility4. We also calculate transition
probabilities of moving from one market regime to another. We ﬁnd that the “normal”
regime is quite persistent and the probability of maintaining this state is 98%. Interestingly,
we ﬁnd that the “down-market” regime has 0 probability of transitioning into a “normal
regime”; if it does transition, it transitions to the “up-market” regime (with 26% probability).
Finally, we ﬁnd the “up-market” regime to be quite transitory, having only 28% probability
of maintaining the state.
Second, the use of regime-switching models of hedge funds is appropriate as many hedge
funds implement regime-switching strategies (Goetzmann et al. (2006)). We are able to
uncover diﬀerent hedge fund exposures in diﬀerent market states of the world.
Another aspect that we are able to highlight using the regime-switching methodology is a
phase-locking property of hedge funds. The link between a hedge fund and risk factors, due to
dynamic strategies employed by hedge funds, is characterized by a phase-locking model. For
example, most of the time factor loadings might be very low or zero for some particular risk
factors, but suddenly factor loadings can become very large. In such a scenario, simple linear
models with linear factor loadings show that hedge fund exposure to risk factors is negligible,
so we are not capturing a small-probability down-market event that would lead to the phase-
locking behavior. As we show, the regime-switching approach is able to capture changes in
factor loadings depending on the state of the market and exposure to risk factors that, most
of the time are negligible and are not captured by linear models. Phase-locking phenomenon
describes a link that is absent most of the time, but is present in low-probability down-
market events (i.e., hedge fund returns have a greatly increased exposure to these factors
during market down-turn: UMD, VIX, Credit spread and Large-Small).
The fourth reason of the relevance of using switching regime beta models to investigate
hedge funds exposure is that liquidity risk is relevant for hedge funds and liquidity shocks are
highly episodic and tend to be preceded by or associated with large and negative asset return
shocks, whereby liquidity risk is rendered a particularly non-linear phenomenon. Indeed, as
stressed by Acharya and Schaefer (2006) prices in capital markets exhibit diﬀerent regimes.
In a normal regime, intermediaries, including hedge funds, are well capitalized and liquidity
eﬀects are minimal. In the “illiquidity” regime usually related to market down-turns, inter-
mediaries are close to their risk or collateral constraints and there is a “cash-in-the-market”
pricing (Allen and Gale (1994, 1998)). In this framework, derivatives and complex struc-
4The expected returns and volatilities for each state are endogenously deﬁned from the data. Section 4
and Table 2 show that the return pattern of S&P 500 could be easily captured with three regimes, where
up-market regime has a mean of 5.79% and a relatively low volatility 1.52%. The normal regime has a mean
of 0.85% and a volatility of 2.49%. The down-market regime captures market downturns and has a mean of
-2.02% and a volatility of 4.51%.
4tured products investors like hedge funds are more likely to be the marginal price setters
and therefore more largely aﬀected by the “illiquidity” regime. With our switching regime
model, we are indeed able to capture the non-linear phenomenon of liquidity shocks and
their eﬀects on hedge funds returns.
In our analysis we investigate several risk factors indicated in the literature as able
to capture liquidity risk in developed and emerging markets such as Large-Small (Fama-
French Factor), Credit Spreads, MSCI Emerging Market Debt and Equity and we found
that the exposure to these risk factors are mostly characterized by zero exposure during the
normal state and signiﬁcant exposure during market downturns. Nevertheless, given the large
collinearity between market risk, asset liquidity risk and hedge fund funding liquidity risk,
we are not able to distinguish statistically the relative return impacts of funding liquidity,
liquidity risk and market risk. However, we ﬁnd some evidence that the total eﬀect of these
risks matters for hedge fund returns.
The ﬁfth reason for using the switching regime beta model is that it allows for non-
linearity in residuals. We are able to investigate the dynamic evolution of the idiosyncratic
risk factor in terms of changes from a low volatility regime to a high volatility state that
is independent of observable risk factors. The switching regimes captured by our model in
the idiosyncratic risk factor can be a proxy for an opportunistic risk taking. Indeed, as we
know from practitioners, there is a persistency in risk taking conditional on the hedge fund
performance that may change quickly as soon as hedge fund expectations change. Moreover,
the switch in volatility of the idiosyncratic risk factor may also capture hedge fund exposure
to “latent” risk factors that change randomly over time. These latent risk factors could
again capture liquidity risk not directly related to the capital market. Speciﬁcally, Brown
and Spitzer (2006) conjecture that idiosyncratic volatility can capture liquidity risk not
related to the market risk. Our analysis shows that the idiosyncratic risk factor of hedge
funds is largely characterized by changes from a low volatility regime to a high volatility state
that are not directly related to market risk factors. We further explored the probability that
all hedge fund strategies exhibit idiosyncratic risk in a high volatility regime. This could
be interpreted as a proxy measure for contagion between diﬀerent hedge fund strategies.
Speciﬁcally, we calculate the joint probability of being in a high volatility state for all hedge
funds. We ﬁnd that the joint probability jumps from approximately 0% in May, 1998 to 4%
in June, 1998 to 13% in July, 1998 to 96% in August of 1998. It started to subside in October,
1998. The peak in the joint probability coincides with the liquidity crisis precipitated by
the collapse of LTCM. The results suggest that the LTCM crisis not only aﬀected market
risk factors, but also, after controlling for market and other factor exposures, it aﬀected
idiosyncratic volatility of hedge funds. This provides evidence that even after accounting
5for market and other factor exposures, the LTCM crisis precipitated contagion across the
hedge fund industry. This result is consistent with the one provided by Boyson, Stahel and
Stulz (2006) where by using extreme events, they found contagion among diﬀerent hedge
fund styles.
Our approach is diﬀerent from percentile or extreme returns analysis because factor load-
ings depend on an underlying state variable that has an intuitive interpretation in terms of
market regimes and where down-market period may also face positive returns. Our approach
also diﬀers from the Asset-Based Style Factors (ABS) (Fung and Hsieh (2001)) approach be-
cause we do not need to deﬁne a priory the strategy that hedge funds may follow, but in
line with the classical Sharpe-style analysis approach (Sharpe, (1992)), we leave the data to
highlight the dynamic exposure to risk factors.
Our analysis shows that market risk factor exposures are diﬀerent but not necessarily
directly related to a particular option strategy, but are more related to a mixture of strategies
based on options. In the spirit of Fung and Hsieh (2001) and Agarwal and Naik (2004), we
are suggesting a more ﬂexible approach, where a whole range of options strategies can be
captured, and we do not have to be limited to several speciﬁc exogenously-deﬁned options.
Our analysis indeed conﬁrms that hedge funds are using diﬀerent regime-switching strategies
and change their exposure based on diﬀerent market conditions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related literature review is presented in
Section 2. In Section 3 we deﬁne a series of beta switching regime models that can be used
to analyze the diﬀerent hedge fund style indexes. Section 4 describes the data and presents
results for the one factor and multifactor beta switching regime models. Section 5 uncovers
additional phase locking exposures and presents an analysis on omitted factors. Section
6 presents analysis on evolution of the idiosyncratic factor. Section 7 provides robustness
checks. We compare our approach to OLS, asymmetric beta and threshold models. We also
adjust for potential illiquidity and smoothing in the data and check that regime-switching
approach is applicable to individual hedge funds as well as indexes. Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature Review
The tremendous increase in the number of hedge funds and availability of hedge fund data
has attracted a lot of attention in the academic literature that has been concentrated on
analyzing hedge funds styles (Fung and Hsieh (2001) and Mitchell and Pulvino (2001)), per-
formance and risk exposure (Fung and Hsieh (1997), Brealey and Kaplanis (2001), Edwards
and Caglayan (2001), Agarwal and Naik (2004), Bali, Gokcan and Liang (2005), Gupta and
6Liang (2005), and Schneeweis, Karavas, and Georgiev (2002)), liquidity, systemic risk and
contagion issues (Getmansky et al. (2004), Chan et al. (2006) and Boyson, Stahel and Stulz
(2006)). All of the above studies ﬁnd that risk return characteristics of the hedge fund strate-
gies are nonlinear, that hedge funds implement dynamic strategies and exhibit nonlinear and
non-normal payoﬀs. The analysis of risk exposure is based on three main approaches. The
ﬁrst approach is based on the classical linear factor model applied to mutual funds. The
second approach is introduced by Fund and Hsieh (1997), based on a predetermined struc-
ture on the risk factors (quintiles analysis or extreme event analysis). The third approach is
based on option-like payoﬀs called also Asset-Based Style Factors (ABS-Factors) introduced
by Fung and Hsieh (2001) and Agarwal and Naik (2004).
Currently, no parametric models5 exist in the hedge fund literature that explain a time-
varying hedge fund risk exposure without imposing exogenous deﬁnition of diﬀerent states
of the world (i.e. up or down markets, declines or rallies), speciﬁc non-linear structures or
the use of option-like approach.
We diﬀerentiate from previous literature because our aim is not to investigate the strate-
gies that hedge funds are following, our model is strategy-independent. We analyze risk
factor exposure that can be both generated by speciﬁcs of hedge funds strategies or by some
latent factors aﬀecting the assets held by hedge funds. Therefore, the fact that each hedge
fund is not implementing the same strategy within the same hedge fund category makes our
model more desirable to use. Moreover, we endogenously estimate conditional distributions
of market returns in each market regime, derive the likelihood of transition from one state
to another and calculate time-varying hedge fund risk exposures for each of the regimes.
Fung and Hsieh (1997) emphasize limitations of models, including their own, that put
structure on the risk factor. However, given that hedge fund data became available only
in 1994 6, Fung and Hsieh (1997) had to resort to building models with a predetermined
structure on the risk factor, such as conducting a quintile analysis. Given current availability
of more than 10 years of monthly data, we can conduct a thorough analysis on hedge fund
returns that could not be done before due to data limitations. In a completely ﬂexible
approach, in the same spirit as Fung and Hsieh (1997), we measure the exposure of the
hedge fund indexes to risk factors in diﬀerent states, i.e. when the market risk factor is facing
normal returns and volatility, or when the market is facing low returns and high volatility, or
some other states where the states are not exogenously imposed but endogenously determined
5Li and Kazemi (2006) propose a nonparametric GARCH (1,1) model to study asymmetry in conditional
correlations.
6CSFB/Tremont database for hedge fund indexes starts in January, 1994. Individual hedge funds were
available prior to 1994; however, the database is only adjusted for survivorship bias starting January 1994.
7by the model.
This aspect is extremely important because we avoid the problem of exogenously ﬁxing
the regimes (or state thresholds) and we are able to provide more information in terms of
the likelihood of being in one regime or the other. This last aspect allows us to calculate the
likelihood for hedge funds switching from one exposure to another.
The importance of using regime-switching models is well established in the ﬁnancial
economics literature after Bekaert and Harvey’s (1995) regime switching asset pricing model,
Ang and Bekaert’s (2002) and Guidolin and Timmerman (2006) regime switching asset
allocation model and Billio and Pelizzon’s (2005) analysis of contagion among markets.
Moreover, regime-switching models have been successfully applied to constructing trading
rules in equity markets (Hwang and Satchell (2000), equity and bond markets (Brooks and
Persand (2001)), and foreign exchange markets (Dueker and Neely (2004)). The closest to our
paper implementation is by Chan, Getmansky, Haas and Lo (2005) where regime switching
models are applied to the CSFB/Tremont hedge fund indexes to analyze the possibility of
switching from a normal to a distressed regime in the hedge fund industry.
Our approach diﬀers from the previous work since we use a switching regime beta model
to measure the exposure of hedge funds indexes to diﬀerent regimes that characterize market
risk factors. Such exposure cannot be measured with the simple switching regime model used
by Chan et al. (2005) because they do not analyze the relationship with the market risk factor
and the regimes of the market risk factor. Accounting for regime-switching in market returns
is very important for optimal investment decision by an investor. For example, using a sample
of mutual funds, Tiwari (2006) found 341 basis points per month utility loss from ignoring
regime switching for an investor who has perfect prior conﬁdence in the 4-factor Carhart
model. We conjecture that for hedge funds that have more non-linearities and asymmetric
exposure to market factors compared to mutual funds, not accounting for regime switching in
market factors will lead to even a greater economic loss. By using regime-switching models,
investors can identify and select hedge funds and hedge fund indexes with favorable market
exposure in each regime and in particular in market downturns. They will also be more
informed about transition probabilities between diﬀerent regimes and probabilities of being
exposed to several market factors.
Moreover, an important question in hedge fund literature is to understand risk exposure
of hedge funds especially in extreme states of the world. Pierre Saint-Laurent (2005) in
a recent article said that it is very important to understand returns and risks in market
downturns or under distress. With our analysis we are able to shed a light on this issue and
verify if there are some states where the diﬀerent hedge fund strategies would be exposed to
the same factors indicating the possibility of a systematic risk among the hedge fund family.
83 Theoretical Framework
Linear factor models such as the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and the arbitrage
pricing theory (APT) have been the foundation of most of the theoretical and empirical
asset pricing literature. Formally, a simple one factor model applied to hedge fund index
returns could be represented as:
Rt = α + βIt + ωut (1)
where Rt is the return of a hedge-fund index in period t, It is a factor, for example, S&P500
in period t, and ut is IID.
In this model, we can identify the exposure of hedge fund returns to a factor I. Unfor-
tunately this theory constrains the relation between risk factors and returns to be linear.
Therefore it cannot price securities whose payoﬀs are nonlinear functions of the risk factors,
i.e. hedge fund returns which are characterized by the implementation of dynamic strategies.
For this reason we propose a more ﬂexible and complete model for capturing this feature: a
switching regime model.
A Markov switching-regime model is a model where systematic and un-systematic events
may change from the presence of discontinuous shifts in average return and volatility. The
change in regime should not be regarded as predictable but as a random event. More formally,
the model could be represented as:
Rt = α + β(St)It + ωut (2)
It = μ(St)+σ(St) t (3)
where St is a Markov chain with n states and transition probability matrix P. Each state
of the market index I has its own mean and variance and the same applies to the returns
of the hedge fund index. More speciﬁcally, the hedge fund mean returns and volatility are
related to the states of the market index and are deﬁned by the parameter α plus a factor
loading, β, on the conditional mean of the factor, where β could be diﬀerent conditional on
a state of a factor risk.





α + β0It + ωut if St =0
α + β1It + ωut if St =1
α + β2It + ωut if St =2
(4)
where the state variable S depends on time t, and β depends on the state variable:
β(St)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
β0 if St =0
β1 if St =1
β2 if St =2
(5)
and the Markov chain St (the regime switching process) is described by the following











with p02 =1−p00 −p01, p12 =1−p10 −p11 and p22 =1−p20 −p22. The parameters p00,
p11 and p22 determine the probability of remaining in the same regime. This model allows for
a change in the variance of returns only in response to occasional, discrete events. Despite
the fact that the state St is unobservable, it can be estimated statistically (see for example
Hamilton (1989,1990)).
Our speciﬁcation is similar to the well-known “mixture of distributions” model. However,
unlike standard mixture models, the regime-switching model is not independently distributed
over time unless transition probabilities pij are equal to 1/n, where n is the number of
states. Indeed, one key aspect of the switching regime model is that if the volatility has
been eﬃciently characterized with diﬀerent parameters for diﬀerent periods of data, it will
be probable that in the future the same pattern will apply. As the switching regime approach
accounts for “short-lived” and “infrequent” events, it provides an accurate representation of
the left-hand tail of the return distribution.
The advantage of using a Markov chain as opposed to a “mixture of distributions” is that
the former allows for conditional information to be used in the forecasting process. This
10allows us to: (i) ﬁt and explain the time series, (ii) capture the well known cluster eﬀect,
under which high volatility is usually followed by high volatility (in presence of persistent
regimes), and (iii) generate better forecasts compared to the mixture of distributions model,
since switching regime models generate a time conditional forecast distribution rather than
an unconditional forecasted distribution.
The Markov switching model is more ﬂexible than just using a truncated distribution
approach as proposed for hedge funds by Asness, Krail and Liew (2001) and Boyson, Strahel
and Stulz (2006) as at each time t, we have a mixture of one or more normal distributions,
and this mixture changes every time. Using the truncated distribution will lead to non-
parametric estimation, where the down state of the market is exogenously imposed, and it
is hard to make inferences about beta forecast and conditional expectations. Instead, we
use a parametric model to help us to separate the states of the world. We will be able
to infer time-varying risk exposures of hedge funds, make forecasts, calculate transitional
probabilities from one state to another and calculate conditional expectations.
Our approach is in the spirit of Agarwal and Naik (2004) but rather than using ABS
factors to capture dynamic strategies, we allow for dynamic factor loadings with diﬀerent
betas. In this way we capture, with a formal model, the idea of Fung and Hsieh (1997) to
separate factors into diﬀerent quintiles based on historical performance and try to access
the exposure of hedge fund returns to factors in each of the quintiles. Moreover, the use of
quintiles implies the exogenous deﬁnition of states. On the contrary, we let the model to
determine the states. Moreover, our formal model allows us to forecast future behavior.
More speciﬁcally, once parameters are estimated, forecasts of changes in regime can be
readily obtained, as well as forecasts of βt itself. In particular, because the k-step transition
matrix of a Markov chain is simply given by Pk, the conditional probability of the regime
St+k given date-t data Rt ≡ (Rt,R t−1,...,R 1) takes on a particularly simple form when the
number of regimes is 2 (regime 0 and 1):
Prob(St+k =0 |Rt)=π1 +( p00 − (1 − p11))
k
 





(2 − p00 − p11)
(8)
where Prob(St =0 |Rt) is the probability that the date-t regime is 0 given the historical
data up to and including date t (this is a by-product of the maximum-likelihood estimation






Prob(St =0 |Rt) Prob(St =1 |Rt) ..Prob(St = n|Rt)
  
(10)






β ≡ [ β0 β1 ..βn]
  (12)
Time-varying betas can be easily determined using equation 11 by assuming that k=0.
This gives us the framework for analyzing time-varying risk exposures for hedge funds for
diﬀerent factors. Moreover, this framework can be used to calculate expected time-varying
risk exposures for hedge funds for various factors, by setting k to be more than 0. For
example, if k=1, we can calculate the evolution of expected one-month beta exposures to
diﬀerent factors.
The previous model described in equations 2 and 3 could be extended in several ways.
For example, we propose a regime switching model with non-linearity in residuals and in the
intercept coeﬃcient:
Rt = α(Zt)+β(St)It + ω(Zt)ut (13)
It = μ(St)+σ(St) t (14)
In this model, additional non-linearities are captured by the intercept and the residuals.
Zt proxies for all other non-linearities not captured by non-linearities between hedge fund
and the risk factor I.
Usually there are more than one factor that aﬀect hedge fund returns. Our switching
regime beta model could be easily extended to a multifactor model.
The ﬁrst extension is a model in the same spirit as of Agarwal and Naik (2004) with a
12non-linear exposure to S&P 500 and a linear exposure to other risk factors. More formally:
Rt = α(Zt)+β(St)It +
K  
k=1
θkFkt + ω(Zt)ut (15)
It = μ(St)+σ(St) t (16)
where θk is the linear factor loading of the hedge fund index on the k-th risk factor and
Fkt is the return on the k-th risk factor at time t.
However, this model does not consider the possibility that the exposure to the other
factors could be aﬀected by the regime that characterizes the S&P 500. To capture this
feature, we propose a multifactor beta switching model with non-linearity in residuals:
Rt = α(Zt)+β(St)It +
K  
k=1
θk(St)Fkt + ω(Zt)ut (17)
I1t = μ(St)+σ(St) t (18)
This model allows us to detect the exposure of hedge fund indexes to diﬀerent factors
conditional on the state that characterizes the market index factor that in our empirical
analysis is represented by the S&P500.
Goodness-of-ﬁt for our non-linear models is measured using McFadden’s (1974) pseudo-
R2 approach. In this approach, the unrestricted (full model) likelihood, LUR is compared to










For the empirical analysis in this paper, we use aggregate hedge-fund index returns from
CSFB/Tremont database from January 1994 to March 2005. The CSFB/Tremont indexes are
asset-weighted indexes of funds with a minimum of $10 million of assets under management,
a minimum one-year track record, and current audited ﬁnancial statements. An aggregate
index is computed from this universe, and 10 sub-indexes based on investment style are
also computed using a similar method. Indexes are computed and rebalanced on a monthly
frequency and the universe of funds is redeﬁned on a quarterly basis. We use net-of-fee
monthly excess return (in excess of LIBOR). This database accounts for survivorship bias
in hedge funds (Fung and Hsieh (2000b)). Table 1 describes the sample size, S&P 500 β,
annualized mean, annualized standard deviation, minimum, median, maximum, skewness
and kurtosis for monthly CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index returns as well as for the S&P
500.
[INSERT Table (1) about here]
For our empirical analysis, we evaluate the exposure of hedge fund indexes to the market
index, S&P 500; therefore, we only concentrate on hedge fund styles that either directly or
indirectly have S&P 500 exposure. For example, we concentrate on directional strategies
such as Dedicated Shortseller, Long/Short Equity and Emerging Markets as well as non-
directional strategies such as Distressed, Event Driven Multi-Strategy and Risk Arbitrage.
Categories greatly diﬀer. For example, annualized mean of excess return for the Dedicated
Shortseller category is the lowest: -6.48% and the annualized standard deviation is the
highest at the 17.63%. Distressed has the highest mean of 7.32%, but relatively low standard
deviation: 6.69%. The lowest annualized standard deviation is reported for the Equity
Market Neutral strategy at 2.94% with an annualized mean of 4.08%. Hedge fund strategies
also show diﬀerent third and fourth moments. Speciﬁcally, non-directional funds such as
Event Driven Multi-Strategy, Risk Arb and Convertible Bond Arb all have negative skewness
and high kurtosis. The exception is for the Equity Market Neutral strategy which has
a low positive skewness and kurtosis. Directional strategies such as Dedicated Shortseller,
Long/Short Equity have positive skewness and small kurtosis. Emerging Markets has a slight
negative skewness of -0.65 and a small kurtosis. The market factor is characterized by high
annualized excess return of 5.52% and high standard deviation of 15.10% during our sample
14period. Moreover, the distribution of the factor is far from normal and is characterized by
negative skewness.
4.2 Beta Switching Regime Models
4.2.1 One factor model
In this section we ﬁrst verify the presence of the S&P 500 regimes in the data, and then
analyze the exposure of diﬀerent hedge fund indexes to the diﬀerent states of the S&P500
market index by implementing the model described in equation 3.
The identiﬁcation of the optimal number of regimes in Markov switching models cannot
be obtained through likelihood ratio tests because such tests are problematic since the usual
regularity conditions are not fulﬁlled under the null hypothesis (some parameters are uniden-
tiﬁed and the information matrix is singular). Hence the asymptotic null distribution of the
likelihood ratio test statistic is not a χ2 one. Hansen (1992) proposed a test which does not
suﬀer from this problem, but his test procedure is computationally burdensome and only
delivers p-values which are an upper bound for the true p-values. A computationally less
demanding test procedure is discussed in Garcia (1998), but this method is theoretically less
attractive than Hansen’s (1992) since it overlooks the problem of the singular information
matrix. An alternative way of circumventing these diﬃculties would be to use critical values
and/or p-values from a bootstrap approximation to the null distribution of the likelihood
ratio test statistic, as suggested by McLachlan (1987) for independent mixture models. It
should be borne in mind, however, that the asymptotic correctness of such bootstrap tests
has not been established yet and is far from obvious.
More recently, Poskitt and Chung (1996), Francq and Zakoan (1998, 2001) and Zhang
and Stine (2001) have shown that weakly stationary processes generated by various Markov-
switching models admit linear autoregressive moving-average (ARMA) representations. Since
the order of these ARMA representations is generally a function of the number of Markov
regimes, Poskitt and Chung (1996), Krolzig (1997) and Zhang and Stine (2001) have argued
that the state dimension of the hidden Markov chain can be determined by estimating the
order of the equivalent ARMA representation of the observable process. Zhang and Stine
(2001) used simulation experiments to examine the properties of the proposed method as a
means of identifying the state order in Markov switching models with no dynamics and com-
pared them with procedures based on the AIC and BIC. In the same spirit, Psaradakis and
Spagnolo (2003) investigate the properties of alternative procedures that exploit the ARMA
representation as well as procedures that are based on optimization of complexity-penalized
15likelihood measures (see also Leroux, 1992).
Since all these procedures are computationally burdensome and outside the objectives of
the paper, we preferred to follow the ﬁnancial intuition and the literature7 that well recognize
the presence of normal times, rolling-up or down-turns times in the returns of the equity
market, to test various models and ﬁnally we decided on three regimes. The results of the
estimation are shown in Table 2.
[INSERT Table (2) about here]
Table 2 shows that the return pattern of S&P 500 could be easily captured with three
regimes, where regime 0 has a mean of 5.79% and a relatively low volatility 1.52%. We
denote this regime as the up-market state, which has a very low probability of remaining
in the same regime next month: P00=28%. The regime 1 has a mean statistically diﬀerent
than zero and equal to 0.85% and a volatility of 2.49% and we call it a normal state. This is
a persistent regime, and the probability of remaining in it is 98%. The last regime captures
market downturns and has a mean of -2.02% and a volatility of 4.51%. The probability of
remaining in this regime is 74%.
The model estimation allows us to infer when S&P 500 was in one of the three regimes
for each date of the sample using the Hamilton ﬁlter and smoothing algorithm (Hamilton,
1994). Figure 1 depicts the resulting series.
[INSERT Figure (1) about here]
From Figure 1 we observe that in the ﬁrst part of the sample, the S&P 500 returns are
frequently characterized by the normal regime 1, in particular from July 1994 to December
1996. The period from 1997 through 2003 is characterized mostly by two other regimes:
up-market and down-market. This outcome is generated mainly by high instability of the
ﬁnancial markets starting from the Asian down-market in 1997, well captured by regime 2,
the technology and internet boom, well captured by regime 0, the Japanese down-market
of March 2001, September 11, 2001 and the market downturn of 2002 and 2003, captured
mostly by regime 2. The last part of the sample from 2003 through 2005 is characterized by
the normal regime 1. It is important to note that the three regimes approach does not imply
7Goetzmann et al. (2006) show that an optimal strategy for hedge funds might be selling out-of-the-
money puts and calls, ensuring that during normal and up markets, hedge fund managers obtain a positive
cash ﬂow, and have a large exposure in extreme negative events.
16simply the split of the data sample into large negative, large positives or close to the mean
returns. The regime approach captures periods where the return distribution belongs to large
volatility periods characterized by large downturns or more tranquil periods. In all these
diﬀerent regimes we may face positive or negatives returns. This approach is closely compared
to an alternative threshold approach where a sample is split into positive and negative
returns, following Fung and Hsieh (1997). These two approaches are carefully compared
in Section 7. More speciﬁcally, the regime switching approach allows us to endogenously
determine changes in market returns distributions without exogenously splitting the data
into positive and negative returns.
This analysis of the S&P 500 returns illustrates the ability of regime-switching models
to capture changes in return process determined endogenously by the model.
In addition to analyzing the change in the S&P 500 returns and probability of being in
a particular regime, we derive both conditional and unconditional distributions for the S&P
500 for all three regimes as well as for the total time series.
[INSERT Figure (2) about here]
Figure 2 depicts unconditional distribution of S&P 500 overall, in down-market, normal
and up-market regimes. First, it is worthwhile to notice that during the time period analyzed
in the paper, market clearly experienced three distinct regimes: up-market, normal and
down-market. Moreover, the total distribution is skewed, and distribution of being in a down-
market state is characterized by fat tails. Figure 2 also depicts conditional distribution of
diﬀerent regimes, conditioned on starting in regime 2, a down-market regime. The resulting
total distribution closely overlaps regime 2 distribution, especially in the left tail. Therefore,
once in down-market, the market is more likely to stay in down-market (74%), and both
conditional regime 2 and total distribution are fat-tailed.
[INSERT Figure (3) about here]
Figure 3 shows conditional distributions of S&P 500 overall, in down-market, normal
and up-market regimes ﬁrst conditional on an up-market regime and second conditional on
a normal regime. Interestingly, conditioned on being in an up-market, there is a certain
probability of staying in an up-market (28%), but there is also a large left-tail probability
of moving to a down-market (67%). It looks like the up-market regime is often transitory,
followed by a down-market. The probability of going to a normal regime after an up-market
17is small (5%). Conditional on being in a normal regime, the total distribution is almost
identical to the conditional probability of a normal regime. Therefore, if a market is in the
normal regime, it is more likely to stay this way (98%). The conditional distributions for all
regimes are very close to normal in this case. Nevertheless, there is a small probability of
2% of moving to an up-market regime that is more likely (67%) followed by a down-market.
Overall, the results conﬁrm that during the period of January, 1994 to March, 2005, S&P
500 was clearly characterized by three separate regimes. In the paper, we are interested in
clearly understanding the exposure of each hedge fund strategy to the market in all these
regimes. In other words, we are interested in ﬁnding the exposure of hedge fund returns to
all parts of this distribution. Moreover, most studies analyzed exposure of hedge funds given
a normal regime. Using the results in Figure 3, it is clear that this approach underestimates
the tail of the distribution and thus biases hedge fund market risk exposure.
After having characterized the process for the S&P 500 we analyze the exposure of
diﬀerent hedge fund strategies to diﬀerent S&P 500 regimes. The analysis is based on the
model presented in equation 13 and results are shown in Table 3.
[INSERT Table (3) about here]
We ﬁnd diﬀerent factor loadings with respect to the S&P 500 regimes for almost all
hedge funds indexes. The only exception is the Convertible Bond Arbitrage strategy. More
speciﬁcally, for Equity Market Neutral we ﬁnd a positive exposure in the regime 0, i.e. when
the market is rolling up. The exposure is zero in normal times and when the market is mostly
characterized by a downturn. This result is in line with the fact that the Market Neutral
strategy can neutralize the eﬀects of normal movements of the market, but when the market
is suddenly moving to another regime facing a phase-locking phenomenon, the exposure
becomes positive. Regarding the other more directional strategies (Dedicated Shortseller
and Long/Short Equity), we do ﬁnd signiﬁcant exposures to the S&P 500 regimes, but again
the factor loadings vary a lot for diﬀerent regimes. In particular, Dedicated Shortseller
shows a large negative exposure of -1.26 to S&P 500 in normal times. This relationship is
maintained for the down-market period; however, the exposure is reduced in half for the
up-market state of the market. Long/Short Equity strategy aims to go both long and short
on the market during the normal regime. Our analysis shows that the exposure to the
market during the normal regime is three times as high as the exposure during the other
two regimes. There is, therefore, an attempt of this strategy to reduce the exposure to the
market down-turns, but the exposure remains still positive, as shown in Table 3.
18The Emerging Market strategy shows a peculiar positive exposure mostly when the mar-
ket is characterized by the down-market state and is relatively large in normal time. The
result of the large exposure on market down-turns is intuitive since many emerging markets
do not allow short-selling. Therefore, the exposure result is similar to writing a put option
on the S&P index.
The other three strategies are related to the Event Driven categories. The exposures to
the S&P 500 are positive and quite similar in diﬀerent states of the market, especially for the
Event Driven Multi-Strategy that has a slightly higher exposure during the market down-
turn. Distressed security strategy presents a larger exposure in normal times. The Risk
Arbitrage Strategy presents a positive exposure in the normal regime and when the market
is rolling up and an almost zero exposure in the down-market regime. Nevertheless, other
risk factors play a role as important as the S&P 500 in characterizing the time-varying hedge
fund exposure. This aspect is investigated in the next section with a multifactor model.
Moreover, using regime switching framework allows us to calculate time-varying risk
exposure of hedge funds implied by the data, i.e. time-varying betas with respect to various
factors including S&P 500 for various hedge fund strategies. So far, this has not been
accomplished in previous research due to predominant use of non-parametric models in
explaining hedge fund risks. Time-varying betas can be easily determined using equation 11
by assuming that k=0. This gives us the framework for analyzing time-varying risk exposures
for hedge funds for diﬀerent factors. Time-varying market risk betas are depicted for several
hedge fund strategies in Figures 4 and 5.
[INSERT Figure (4) about here]
[INSERT Figure (5) about here]
First, note that the market exposure changes over time for all strategies, conﬁrming that
hedge funds are implementing dynamic strategies. Figure 4 depicts evolution of market betas
for Hedge fund index, Long/Short equity and Risk arbitrage strategies. In all cases, starting
the middle of 2003, exposure of these strategies to the market dramatically increased. For
example, for the Combined Hedge fund index, the forecasted exposure in April, 2004 was
0.07, seemingly market-neutral; however, exposure in March, 2005 increased to 0.37, which
is a signiﬁcant positive market exposure. For the same time period, the exposure of the
Long/Short equity increased from 0.20 to 0.64, more than 3-fold. Risk arbitrage strategy
exposure more than doubled during this time period to 0.14. It is interesting to note that in
all these categories, the market beta is cyclical: it was increasing from 1994 through 1997,
19then it abruptly dropped and stayed low for 7 years, and started to increase in 2003. Similar
behavior is also observed for Convertible bond arbitrage, Distressed, and Dedicated short
seller (for this strategy, the exposure is increasing in the negative direction). This cyclical
behavior in market beta can be largely attributed to the changes in market regimes. For
example, as was found in Figure 1, we observe that in the ﬁrst part of the sample, the S&P
500 returns are frequently characterized by the normal regime 1, in particular from July
1994 to December 1996. The period from 1997 through 2003 is characterized mostly by two
other regimes: up-market and down-market. The last part of the sample from 2003 through
2005 is characterized by the normal regime.
Figure 5 shows a diﬀerent story compared to results depicted in Figure 4. Here, we show
strategies which have a recent decrease either in volatility of the market beta or decrease
in the market beta estimate implied from the data. For example, for the Event driven
multi-strategy, the exposure decreased from 0.17 in 2003 to 0.14 in March, 2005. For the
Emerging markets category, since 1997 to 2003, the exposure ﬂuctuated a lot, from 0.2 to
0.5. However, since the beginning of 2003, up to the end of the data sample, the market
exposure equilibrated at 0.41. The same behavior is observed for Equity market neutral
strategy, where from 1997 to 2003, the exposure ﬂuctuated from 0.03 to 0.09, equilibrating
to 0.07 starting the middle of 2003.
Moreover, this framework can be extended to calculating expected hedge fund exposures
to diﬀerent factors one-month from now, 6-months from now, 1-year from now and so on.
Our ﬂexible approach can allow us to calculate expected time-varying betas for t+k periods
by using speciﬁcation 11.
The above analysis has shown that the exposure to S&P index changes through time.
Nevertheless, overall the market exposure seems to be not so strong and in the down-turn
state only the Emerging Market index seems to present a large exposure to the S&P.
4.2.2 Multifactor model
Multifactor model with non-linear exposure only to S&P 500
As discussed above, other factors are aﬀecting hedge fund index returns and this calls
for the use of a multifactor framework. We begin with a comprehensive set of risk factors
that will be candidates for each of the risk models, covering stocks, bonds, currencies, com-
modities, emerging markets, momentum factor and volatility. These factors are presented
in Table 4. They are also described by Chan, Getmansky, Haas and Lo (2005). We use
step-wise approach to limit the ﬁnal list of factors for our analysis. Using a combination of
20statistical methods and empirical judgement, we use these factors to estimate risk models for
the 8 hedge fund indexes. In all our analysis, hedge fund returns, S&P 500, USD, Lehman
Government Credit, Gold, MSCI Emergent Markets Bond Index, MSCI Emergent Market
Stocks Index and Momentum French factor are used in excess of LIBOR returns.
[INSERT Table (4) about here]
We ﬁrst consider the model presented in equation (15) and the results for this model are
contained in Table 5. Here, we are considering linear factors: Large-Small, Value-Growth,
USD, Lehman Government Credit, Term Spread, change in VIX, Credit Spread, Gold, MSCI
Emergent Markets Bond Index, MSCI Emergent Market Stocks Index, Momentum French
factor and non-linear exposure to diﬀerent states of the S&P 500.
[INSERT Table (5) about here]
The number of factors F selected for each risk model varies from a minimum of 2 for Risk
Arbitrage to a maximum of 8 for the Event Driven Multi-Strategy, not including the S&P
500 index. This pattern is plausible because the Event Driven Multi-Strategy by deﬁnition
includes a broad set of strategies hence a broad array of risk factors is needed to capture the
variation in this category versus other categories.
The statistical signiﬁcance of the factor loadings on S&P 500 conditional on the diﬀerent
regimes is almost the same as the one obtained in the previous analysis with only the S&P
500 risk factor. The only main diﬀerence is the exposure of the Distressed strategy in the
up-market state to the S&P500 and the exposure of the Emerging Markets strategy in the
up-market and normal states to the S&P 500. This indicates that the analysis performed
above is robust to the inclusion of other factors that may aﬀect hedge index returns.
Regarding the Fama and French factor: Large Minus Small, we observe that this factor is
relevant for almost all the hedge fund index strategies, the only exception is Equity Market
Neutral. The exposure to the Large Minus Small factor is negative for almost all the Hedge
funds indexes (the only exception is the Dedicated Shortseller) suggesting that returns of
these hedge indexes resemble those achieved by going long on small stocks and short on large
stocks (as shown already by Agarwal and Naik (2004) and Chan et al. (2005)). Another
potential explanation is that this factor is capturing liquidity risk as highlighted by Amihud
(2002) and Acharya et al. (2004). We will consider this aspect later.
21The hedge fund exposure to another Fama and French factor: Value Minus Growth
is positive for Convertible Bond Arbitrage, Dedicated Shortseller, Distressed, Event Drive
Multi-Strategy and Risk Arbitrage.
A detailed analysis of other factors is presented for each hedge fund strategy. The list
of factors and hedge fund exposures to these factors is unique for each hedge fund strategy;
therefore, we are analyzing them one by one for each hedge fund strategy.
Convertible Bond Arbitrage
This strategy is characterized by investing in a company bond while shorting the common
stock of the same company. Positions are designed to protect the principal from market
moves. As it was shown before in one-factor setting, the convertible bond arbitrage strategy
is not correlated with S&P 500 moves in all regimes (Table 3). However, in the multi-factor
setting, we ﬁnd a slight positive exposure of 0.04 to the S&P 500 in the up-market. There are
two potential explanations for this eﬀect. First, as market moves up, hedge fund managers
do not have adequate time to hedge the stock exposure by shorting more stock. Second, the
arbitrageurs would like to capitalize on the up-market move, and will not hedge perfectly in
order to make more money. The strategy is doing better when returns on small and value
stocks are high. Clearly, because the strategy is designed to proﬁt from upward ﬁxed income
moves, the strategy is positively related to the Lehman Government Credit bond index
returns. The most signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in the regression is -1.77 eﬀect of Credit Spread.
Clearly, when credit spread increases, liquidity decreases and there is a low demand for low-
credit securities. Convertible Bond Arbitrage funds mostly hold low-credit securities. At the
time of high credit spreads, brokers request a higher hair-cut fee to obtain more leverage.
Cost of funding goes up, therefore, the return on the strategy decreases.
Dedicated Shortseller
This strategy is geared to maintain net short position at all times. The highest net
negative market exposure is during the normal regime of the market. Dedicated Shortseller
strategy is doing well when large and value indexes are performing well. The strategy also
has a positive exposure to the US Dollar and MSCI Emergent Bond returns. Similar to the
Convertible Bond Arbitrage strategy, this strategy has a negative exposure (-0.73) to the
Credit Spread. However, the exposure is about twice as small: -0.73 compared to -1.77. It
makes sense, as credit spread increases, the cost of shorting a stock increases, thus, decreasing
the returns of the strategy.
Emerging Markets
22This strategy involves both equity and ﬁxed income investing around the world. The net
market exposure is positive in all states of the world (insigniﬁcant in the normal state of
the world), which makes sense because many emerging markets do not allow or have limited
short selling and do not oﬀer viable futures or derivative products with which to hedge
market exposure. Especially, during crises periods, the exposure is highly positive (0.39)
due to inability to hedge this exposure. The strategy is performing well when small stocks
are doing better than large stocks, which can be attributed to liquidity premium. The eﬀect
of the US Dollar is positive and signiﬁcant (0.27). Stronger US Dollar increases demand
for foreign goods, thus, boosting emerging markets economy. Since many emerging markets
funds invest in ﬁxed income, it makes sense that the relationship between the Lehman
Government Credit index returns and the strategy returns is positive and signiﬁcant (0.57).
Moreover, an increase in the term spread has a positive eﬀect (0.65) on the strategy returns.
The strategy is doing well when the yield curve is sloping up (the exposure to Term-Spread is
0.65). The Emerging Markets strategy has a big and signiﬁcant (estimate is 0.21 and t-stat
is 6.81) exposure to the MSCI Emergent Stock, which makes sense as this strategy trades
directly in this market. Finally, there is a slight positive exposure to the Momentum Factor
and Gold.
Equity Market Neutral
The strategy is designed to be market beta neutral, which is conﬁrmed for normal market
conditions (0.05 and not signiﬁcant). However, the strategy is not neutral during up-market
times. Managers are not able to timely put market hedges in place, thus, the strategy is
positively exposed to upward market movements (0.11). The strategy seems to be marginally
exposed to Lehman Government Credit index and MSCIEMS.
Long/Short Equity
The strategy takes both long and short market positions. During the normal times of the
market factor, the exposure is 0.51 and remains almost the same in both down-market and
up-market periods. The strategy is doing well when small stocks do well. The strategy is
doing well during the low interest rate environment (the exposure to the Lehman Government
Credit index returns is positive = 0.23). Generally, the strategy is doing well when the yield
curve is ﬂat. So, if long or short-term rates are changing, then the return of the Long/Short
Equity strategy decreases as can be seen by a negative coeﬃcient on the term spread (-
0.30). The exposure to the Credit Spread is -2.27 and very signiﬁcant, which is consistent
with the general preference for small illiquid stocks and increase in stock lending rate in
increased credit spread environments. The strategy also beneﬁts from increase in volatility
and momentum factor.
23Distressed
Distressed strategy primarily concentrates on investing in the debt, equity or trade claims
of companies in ﬁnancial distress and generally bankruptcy. There is a modest market
exposure during normal times (0.30) and the exposure increases during down-market times.
The strategy is doing well when small stocks are outperforming their large counterparts and
when value stocks perform better than growth stocks. Because the strategy is also investing
in ﬁxed income, it is highly positively correlated with the Lehman Government Credit index
returns (0.23). Similar to Convertible Bond Arbitrage, the strategy suﬀers from increase
in credit spreads, as the strategy primarily invests in Distressed, or low-quality and highly
illiquid securities. These distressed securities will greatly suﬀer in liquidity crises. Therefore,
compared to all other strategies, the coeﬃcient (-2.69) on Credit Spread for the Distressed
strategy is the largest. There is also a slight negative exposure to the MSCI Emergent Bond
index.
Event Driven Multi-Strategy
This subset refers to hedge funds that draw upon multiple themes, including risk arbi-
trage, distressed securities, and occasionally others such as investments in micro and small
capitalization public companies that are raising money in private capital markets. Fund
managers often shift assets between strategies in response to market opportunities. There-
fore, the market exposure is positive in all market states. The strategy is doing well when
small stocks are outperforming large ones. Event Driven Multi-Strategy managers are op-
portunistic and therefore when US Dollar is stronger, they have more investing power and
can take advantage of more investment opportunities. Therefore, the relationship between
the US Dollar and strategy returns is 0.32. There is a positive, but small exposure to change
in VIX (0.06). The most signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in the regression is -2.43 eﬀect of Credit
Spread. Clearly, when credit spread increases, liquidity decreases and there is a low demand
for low-credit securities. Event Driven Multi-Strategy funds mostly hold low-credit secu-
rities. At the time of high credit spreads, brokers request a higher hair-cut fee to obtain
more leverage. Cost of funding goes up, therefore, the return on the strategy decreases. The
strategy also has a positive exposure to MSCI Emergent Bond and Stock indexes as well as
to the Momentum Factor.
Risk Arbitrage
Specialists invest simultaneously in long and short positions in both companies involved
in a merger or acquisition. Risk arbitrageurs are typically long the stock of the company
being acquired and short the stock of the acquiring company. Market exposure is positive
especially in crises periods (0.17), indicating that managers in this strategy take a lot of risk.
24The strategy is correlated with the performance of small versus large stocks (-0.14). There
is a small premium to value stocks (0.07).
Multifactor model with non-linear exposure to all factors
Finally we estimate the multifactor model speciﬁed in equation (17) and the results
are contained in Table 6. Here, we are considering non-linear exposure to factors: S&P 500,
Large-Small, Value-Growth, USD, Lehman Government Credit, Term Spread, change in VIX,
Credit Spread, Gold, MSCI Emergent Markets Bond Index, MSCI Emergent Market Stocks
Index and Momentum factor. The three coeﬃcients that we estimate represent the non-linear
exposure to the risk factors of the hedge fund indexes in the three states of the S&P500.
Because of the limited dataset we only consider variables that are statistically signiﬁcant
in the previous multifactor linear exposure analysis. Later we relax this assumption and
consider the possibility of a non-linear exposure also to other risk factors that were not
linked to the hedge fund indexes in the previous linear multifactor analysis (See section 5).
[INSERT Table (6) about here]
All strategies have exposure to the S&P 500 in at least one regime even after account-
ing for conditional exposure to other risk factors. Generally, we ﬁnd that the model that
accounts for diﬀerent factors conditional on the state of the market is richer and captures
more exposures compared to previous models. Moreover, the model is showing that factor
exposure is changing conditional on the state of the market. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the
main risk factor for hedge funds is not necessarily only the market, but the Credit Spread,
especially, the eﬀect of the Credit Spread in the negative states of the market. For most of
the strategies (except Dedicated Shortseller), the impact of the Credit Spread in the negative
market regime on hedge fund index returns is negative, and it is the most negative compared
to up-market and normal regimes.
For ﬁve out of eight strategies (Convertible Bond Arbitrage, Emerging Markets, Dis-
tressed, Event-Driven Multi Strategy and Risk Arbitrage) our results suggests that they
tend to hold illiquid and low-credit securities and thus are susceptible to liquidity crises. We
ﬁnd that in all of these strategies, exposure to LS (Large-Small) is negative and highly sig-
niﬁcant during market downturn. In all these cases the exposure is higher in absolute value
compared to the exposure to LS during other market conditions. Actually, for Convertible
Bond Arbitrage, Event-Driven Multi Strategy and Risk Arbitrage, the exposure to LS dur-
ing normal market conditions is negligible. Overall, almost all hedge fund indexes have a
25signiﬁcant exposure to the Large Minus Small factor in at least two out of three states and
especially during market downturn. This result is in line with the potential interpretation
of Acharya and Schaefer (2006) that the “illiquidity” regime is usually related to market
down-turns. Furthermore, note that LS is the only common factor in the market down-turn
for seven out of eight hedge funds strategies and for six out of eight it has the same sign.
This result suggests that this variable may potentially capture a common factor in the hedge
fund industry.
Moreover, credit spread can also serve as a proxy for illiquidity risk. When credit spread
increases, cost of capital increases and investors prefer to invest in more liquid and high-
quality instruments. Therefore, low-credit illiquid investments suﬀer. We ﬁnd a highly
negative coeﬃcient on credit spread during down market conditions for Convertible Bond
Arbitrage, Long/Short Equity, Distressed and Event-Driven Multi-Strategy. In all of these
cases except Distressed, the exposure to credit spread during down market conditions is
much higher in absolute terms compared to normal market conditions.
Furthermore, our analysis shows that many factor exposures are characterized by the
phase-locking property. For example, the exposure to Lehman Government Credit is negli-
gible for Convertible Bond Arbitrage and Long/Short Equity indexes; however, it becomes
highly positive and signiﬁcant for up and down-market states. The exposure to USD is
negligible in the normal state of the market, but becomes highly positive and signiﬁcant
for Dedicated Shortseller and Emerging Markets. Nevertheless, note that the phase locking
phenomenon could be produced by dynamic strategies and/or a factor exposure of hedge
fund asset portfolio that becomes statistically relevant only in certain states. With our ap-
proach we are not able to distinguish among the two phenomena and simply capture the total
exposure that arises from both dynamic strategies and asset portfolio non-linear exposures.
Below we consider each strategy separately and address time-varying risk exposures for
various factors.
Convertible Bond Arbitrage
Compared to previous results, the Convertible Bond Arbitrage strategy has a signiﬁcant
positive exposure to the S&P 500 during up-market times. During normal times and down-
market, there is no exposure because managers typically perfectly hedge market ﬂuctuations.
Therefore, during market up turns, the strategy is positively related to the market. The
strategy has a positive exposure to credit spread when market is in the normal times (0.87).
The spread reﬂects investor perception relating to how likely the issuing company will be
able to make timely interest payments and pay oﬀ the principal at maturity. The larger, or
wider, the spread, the more concern investors have regarding the issuing company’s ability to
26make timely interest payments. During normal times of the market, investors are less worried
about the increase in credit spread. However, during crises times, this worry is more sound
and the strategy is negatively compensated for having a high credit spread (-2.67). During
up-market times of the market, the coeﬃcient on the term spread is -2.10. We observe this
minus sign because convertible bond funds tend to short stock.
Dedicated Shortseller
This strategy has signiﬁcant exposure to all factors in diﬀerent states of the market. The
exposure to credit spread in a normal-market period is (-6.42) and positive in both up-market
(0.36) and down-market (3.18). The strategy is positively exposed to the MSCIEMD in the
down-market and negatively exposed in the normal market.
Emerging Markets
During up, normal and down states of the market, the eﬀect of term spread is positive and
signiﬁcant (0.86, 0.47 and 1.40 respectively). In a way, the managers implement a strategy
of going long on longer maturity bond and shorting a shorter maturity bond. In crises states
of the market, this strategy is very vulnerable to liquidity shocks. If the short-term interest
rate is rising, the strategy will lose money in those states. Interestingly, the exposure to the
MSCI Emergent Stock is greatly reduced in the down market periods.
Equity Market Neutral
In the previous analysis on multi-factor model with linear factors, Equity Market Neutral
index appears to be linked only to the Lehman Government Credit and MSCI Emergent Bond
risk factors. Allowing for non-linearities, we ﬁnd that the exposure to the MSCI Emergent
bond risk factor is positive in the up-market and not signiﬁcant for other regimes. The
exposure to the S&P 500 is positive and signiﬁcant for both neutral and up-market and not
signiﬁcant for the down market.
Long/Short Equity
The exposure to credit spread in a down-market period is (-3.19) and in a normal period
is (-1.78), whereas, in an up-market period is (3.66). It can be interpreted that generally
Long/Short Equity managers tend to buy low liquidity, low credit rated instruments; how-
ever, in the up-market, they quickly adjust their exposure to buying high credit securities.
This might make sense because managers tend to take concentrated trades in speciﬁc sectors
or markets. The change in VIX is positively related to the strategy return in up and normal
states of the S&P 500.
Distressed
27The exposure to credit spread is negative and signiﬁcant during all regimes of the credit
spread, meaning that distressed funds always hold illiquid and low quality securities. This
strategy is usually categorized by taking positions in companies that will do better in the
future through restructuring and other means. Therefore, an increase in credit spread sends
a signal that these companies might have an inability to make timely interest payments.
Therefore, the relationship between credit spread and Distressed returns is negative in all
states of the market factor.
Distressed funds also hold bonds; therefore, the exposure to Lehman Government Credit
bonds is positive in all states in the world, the highest being in the up-market (0.52).
Event Driven Multi-Strategy
Similar to previous results, the exposure to the change in VIX is positive and signiﬁcant,
especially during up-market periods (0.22). The strategy has a high negative exposure to
credit spread in all states of the market (however, signiﬁcant only for the down market).
Generally, event driven types of strategies do well when credit risk premium is moderate
and is declining. However, unlike Distressed strategy managers, managers in this strategy
might bet on a merger or engage in other strategies during market upturns. The exposure
to MSCIEMS and UMD is positive and signiﬁcant only in down-market environments.
Risk Arbitrage
As for Equity Market Neutral, the linear exposure of risk factor of this strategy is limited.
Below, we will investigate if non-linear exposure to other risk factors is relevant for this
strategy.
As a robustness check, we check whether statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients are also
statistically diﬀerent. We investigate this aspect for diﬀerent hedge fund indexes and indeed
for some coeﬃcients we cannot reject the hypothesis that they are equal. Nevertheless, even
if some of the estimated coeﬃcients are similar, we are able to ﬁnd that some of them are
statistically equal only in two of the three states. This conﬁrms that factor exposure changes
conditional on diﬀerent states.
In summary, our results show that factor exposures are diﬀerent for various factors con-
ditional on the state of the market risk factor and for the diﬀerent hedge fund indexes. A
model that accounts for diﬀerent factors conditional on the state of the market is richer and
captures more exposures compared to previous models. Moreover, the model is showing that
factor exposure is changing conditional on the state of the market. This conﬁrms our initial
hypothesis that the exposures to diﬀerent risk factors are time-varying and conditional on the
state of the market risk factor. Indeed, for many factors we observe that the risk exposure
is zero or positive, and suddenly becomes negative or opposite during crises periods.
285 Omitted Factors
The step-wise linear approach was used to limit the ﬁnal list of factors for the analysis in the
multifactor models with linear and non-linear exposures (Tables 5 and 6). However, the step-
wise linear analysis uses linear models and might miss several risk factors that can impact
the return proﬁle of hedge fund strategies. Speciﬁcally, the step-wise linear analysis could
miss phase-locking exposures, i.e., exposures that are only present during market downturns,
exposures related to liquidity events and low-probability events or exposures with diﬀerent
signs for diﬀerent regimes. In this section we attempt to account for the omitted factors and
perform several analyses of potential non-linear risk exposures not highlighted in previous
sections. Speciﬁcally, we are considering factors that were originally eliminated by the step-
wise linear procedure and are not considered in Tables 5 and 6.
Our analysis shows that one omitted factor for Convertible Bond Arbitrage, Dedicated
Shortseller, Distressed and Risk Arbitrage strategies is the change in VIX. For these strategies
VIX is important as return process of these strategies is related to market volatility. For
example, convertible bonds contain imbedded equity call options that allow investors to
convert the bonds into shares if share prices rise.
[INSERT Table (7) about here]
Change in VIX is a variable that needs to be interpreted jointly with diﬀerent regimes of
the S&P 500 because changes in the S&P 500 are captured by time-varying betas on the S&P
500 (i.e., market risk exposures). For the Convertible Bond Arbitrage strategy, the eﬀect of
Change in VIX is negative in crises markets (-0.08) and positive in up-markets (0.05). The
relationship between Convertible bond price and Stock price is concave when stock price is
low (down-market) and highly convex when the stock price is high (up-market). Therefore,
in the up-market, we will expect change in volatility to attribute to additional returns of the
strategy, and in down-markets, the change in volatility negatively aﬀects the returns of the
strategy.
For Risk Arbitrage, the exposure to change in VIX is positive and signiﬁcant, especially
during normal periods (0.13), but negative during down-market periods (-0.09). Risk Arbi-
trage strategy is concerned with the success of a merger and increase in volatility in down-
times often signals an increase in probability of failure. The same applies to Distressed
strategies.
29Another example is the eﬀect of change in VIX for the Dedicated Short Bias strategy. We
ﬁnd that the exposure to the change in VIX is highly positive only in the negative market
state (0.27), but negative in all other states (-0.42 for up-state and -0.27 for normal state). In
this case the exposure to the change in VIX is opposite to the Distressed strategy potentially
due to the negative market exposure of this strategy. In most of these cases the exposure to
the change in VIX shows phase-locking characteristics or switch in the sign of the exposure;
and this is the main reason of why linear factors are not able to capture this exposure.
Another example is the introduction of MSCIEmD for Emerging Markets strategy. We
ﬁnd that the exposure to this factor is negative (-0.53) during market downturn and positive
during up-market (2.26) and normal conditions (0.37). For Equity market neutral we do
ﬁnd that this strategy is largely exposed to Term spread (1.0 in down-turn and -0.54 in the
normal regime) and to Credit spread in market downturn (-1.94).
Credit spread and Term Spread were irrelevant factors for Equity Market Neutral strategy
and were not considered in the models (Tables 5 and 6). We conducted an additional analysis
and considered these factors. We ﬁnd that in normal conditions, credit spread is irrelevant
for Equity Market Neutral strategy. However, in down turns of the market, it is highly
negative and signiﬁcant (-1.93, t-stat: -3.15). Regarding Term spread we observed a change
in the sign: 1.0 in down-turn and -0.54 in the normal regime.
In conclusion, we ﬁnd that using linear models and step-wise linear approach of narrowing
down signiﬁcant factors misses several factors for hedge fund analysis. On average, the eﬀect
of each of the factors is negligible; however, this is due to lumping the eﬀect of each factor
in up-market, down-market and normal state. We ﬁnd that often an eﬀect of a factor can
be positive in an up-state, negative in a down-state and somewhere in-between for a normal
state. However, if we do not separate the factor eﬀects into diﬀerent market regimes, we
underestimate the real hedge fund exposure to this factor. Moreover, we ﬁnd that exposures
to several factors, such as Large-Small, Credit Spread, MSCIEMD are highly negative for
most of strategies in the down-market state. We argue that this exposure could be related to
liquidity risk, but a deep analysis of this issue is needed and is left to further investigation.
6 Idiosyncratic Risk Factor
In addition to the derivation of the expected market exposures, the switching regime beta
model is able to show the evolution of idiosyncratic risk of hedge funds. In particular our
estimation of the Markov chain for the idiosyncratic risk of the hedge funds shows that the
idiosyncratic risk is characterized by two diﬀerent regimes with high and low volatility for
306 of the 8 strategies. Exceptions are Distressed and Dedicated Shortseller that are always
characterized by a large volatility regime (idiosyncratic volatility is 2.29% for Distressed and
1.34% for Dedicated Shortseller. These monthly volatilities are in-line with high volatility
regimes for other strategies). The volatility parameters in the two volatility regimes (high
and low) are largely diﬀerent and the idiosyncratic risk factor of all 6 strategies shows that
the volatility in the high regime is three or four times larger than in the low volatility regime
of the idiosyncratic risk (see in Table 6  0 and  1.) The estimated probability of switching
from one regime to another is on average about 10%, but the probability of remaining in the
same regime is about 90%, meaning that regimes are quite persistent.
The estimations of the coeﬃcients and the evolution of the probability of being in the high
volatility regime for the idiosyncratic risk factor are similar across three models described in
equations 2,13 and 17. Therefore, we only depict results for the model described in equation
17.
Referring to the model estimation presented in Table 6, in Figure 6 we show the evolution
of the probability of being in the high volatility regime for all 6 strategies.
[INSERT Figure(6) about here]
Figure 6 plots monthly probabilities from January 1994 to March 2005 of hedge fund
indexes facing a high volatility regime for the idiosyncratic factor, i.e. volatility of the hedge
fund not related to the volatility of the S&P 500 index and the other risk factors. We see
that the evolution of the volatility of diﬀerent strategies is quite diﬀerent. In particular, we
observe that Long/Short Equity and Emerging Market indexes present a low probability of
being in the high volatility regime in the last part of the sample and a high probability in
the middle of the sample that corresponds to the series of crises and rallies from 1997 till
2001. Therefore, the risk faced by the S&P 500 already captured by the switching beta is
ampliﬁed in the middle of the sample for this strategy. This indicates that not only the
link with the S&P 500 is changing, but that the idiosyncratic risk of the hedge fund index
may switch to the high volatility regime at the same time when the market is characterized
by turbulence. This can be explained by omitted or latent variables such as idiosyncratic
liquidity risk or factors that aﬀect mostly the hedge fund industry (as in the case of LTCM
default). For example, Emerging Markets, Event Driven Multi-strategy, Long/Short Equity
and Risk Arbitrage are all related to diﬀerent liquidity events more or less related to the
LTCM crisis.
31Event Driven Multi-Strategy almost always is characterized by the low volatility regime
for its idiosyncratic risk factor; however, the probability of a high volatility regime greatly
increases for periods characterized by high illiquidity events and other unexpected shocks not
correlated with market returns. For example, in February 1994, the U.S. Federal Reserve
started a tightening cycle that caught many hedge funds by surprise, causing signiﬁcant
dislocation in bond markets worldwide; the end of 1994 witnessed the start of the “Tequila
Crisis” in Mexico; in August 1998, Russia defaulted on its government debt leading to a
liquidity crunch in worldwide ﬁnancial markets; the ﬁrst quarter of 2000 saw a crash of the
Internet boom, and in middle of 2002 there was a drying out of merger activities, decrease
in defaults and release of news about WorldCom accounting problems. During all of these
periods, the probability of a high volatility regime skyrocketed, reaching 1 for the LTCM
and Russian default down-market.
The most interesting indicator is the evolution of being in the high volatility regime by
the Convertible Bond Arbitrage index that indicates that it has moved to a large volatility
regime from the end of 2003 and is still characterized by this regime at the end of the
sample. If we consider jointly the state of the market index (normal time in the last two
years) and the state of the idiosyncratic factor for the Convertible Bond Arbitrage index, we
see that the switching regime beta model is able to disentangle whether the source of risk is
characterized by market conditions or by potential distress in the hedge fund index strategy.
Not surprisingly, April of 2005 (not in the sample period) has seen extremely low returns and
high liquidations in the Convertible Bond Arbitrage sector. Just tracking market exposure
will not lead to this predictive result.
We further explore the probability that all hedge fund strategies exhibit idiosyncratic
risk in a high volatility regime. This could be interpreted as a proxy measure for contagion
between diﬀerent hedge fund strategies. Speciﬁcally, we calculate the joint probability of
being in a high volatility state for all hedge funds and plot them in Figure 7. We ﬁnd that
the joint probability jumps from approximately 0% in May, 1998 to 4% in June, 1998 to
13% in July, 1998 to 96% in August of 1998. It started to subside in October, 1998. The
peak in the joint probability coincides with the liquidity crisis precipitated by the collapse
of LTCM8. The results suggest that the LTCM crisis not only aﬀected market risk factors,
but also, after controlling for market and other factor exposures, it aﬀected idiosyncratic
volatility of hedge funds. This provides an evidence that even after accounting for market
and other factor exposures, the LTCM crisis precipitated contagion across all hedge fund
industry. In our data, we found that this was the only case where the joint probability of
8We check this result against a possibility that randomly we can have all eight strategies exhibiting high
volatility regimes at the same time.
32being in a high volatility state for all hedge funds spiked and approached one. This result is
consistent with the one provided by Boyson, Stahel and Stulz (2006) where by using extreme
events, they found evidence for contagion among diﬀerent hedge fund styles.
[INSERT Figure(7) about here]
7 Robustness Analysis
7.1 Comparison with OLS Regression
In a multifactor setting, we considered the model presented in equation (15) and the results
for this model are contained in Table 5. The natural way to test the regime-switching model
is to compare its results to results obtained using OLS regression. The results for the OLS
regression are presented in Table 8. Results are consistent, meaning, that factor loadings
have the same sign in both models; however, regime-switching model is clearly superior based
on pseudo-R2 metric. For each hedge fund index, pseudo-R2 is larger for regime-switching
models compared to OLS models. Moreover, several estimates that are signiﬁcant in the
regime-switching model are not signiﬁcant for the OLS model.
[INSERT Table (8) about here]
7.2 Asymmetric Beta and Threshold models
An alternative way to study time-varying non-linear hedge fund exposure to market factors is
through an asymmetric beta model. In this model, the distribution of Rt is truncated either
at the median or zero and betas for “up or down” markets are compared. This approach
has been applied to hedge funds in Agarwal and Naik (2004), Mitchell and Pulvino (2001),
Asness, Krail and Liew (2004) and Chan, Getmansky, Haas and Lo (2005). The authors
33found signiﬁcant diﬀerences between “up” and “down” betas. Speciﬁcally, they found Event-
Driven types of strategies including Risk Arbitrage, Distressed and Event-Driven Multi-
Strategy exhibit zero correlation with up-market conditions, but a large positive correlation
during down-market conditions. Emerging Markets strategy shows a much higher down-
market correlation compared to up-market. Moreover, authors ﬁnd that Equity-Market
Neutral strategy has a much higher up-market beta compared to the down-market beta. We
replicate the results and ﬁnd identical results in our analysis 9.
We further extend the asymmetric beta model and develop a threshold model allowing for
three states. Speciﬁcally, we look at asymmetric betas in hedge fund exposure by specifying
diﬀerent beta coeﬃcients for down-markets, normal markets and up-markets. Speciﬁcally,
consider the following regression:




































It if It ≤ μ + σ
0 otherwise
(21)
where It is the return on the index, μ is the mean and σ is its standard deviation.





t , the standard linear model in which fund i’s market betas are






i . The speciﬁcation (20) essentially tries to capture asymmetries in
the index exposures.
Note the diﬀerence between the speciﬁcation of this model and a regime switching model
where in the latter one the expected returns and volatilities for each state are endogenously
deﬁned from the data. Also, the regime switching model may include positive returns for
the down-market state and negative returns for the up-market state.
Using the speciﬁcation (20), we regress hedge fund returns on the S&P 500 index during
up (I
+
t ), normal (I0
t ) and down (I
−
t ) conditions. The results are reported in Table 9. Beta
asymmetries are quite pronounced especially for Emerging Markets, Distressed, Event Driven
Multi-Strategy and Risk Arbitrage. For example, the Distressed index has an up-market beta
of 0.07 (not signiﬁcant)—seemingly market neutral—however, its down-market beta is 0.38!
9Results are not presented here, but available upon request.
34The exposure of the Convertible Bond Arbitrage strategy to the S&P 500 is negligible for
both up and down markets; therefore, a more comprehensive model is needed to measure
the exposure of this style.
[INSERT Table (9) about here]
The results using the threshold model are similar to the ones obtained using regime-
switching methodology presented in Table 3. However, there are several numerical diﬀer-
ences. For example, switching-regime methodology ﬁnds that Market-Neutral strategy has
market-neutral exposure in all states except an up-market state. However, the threshold
methodology ﬁnd positive market exposure in up (I
+
t ) and down (I
−
t ) states. Regime-
switching methodology also identiﬁes a positive market exposure in the “up-market” state
for Emerging Market strategy; whereas, the threshold methodology misses this link.
Comparing (Table 9 and Table 5), we observe that regime-switching model ﬁts data much
better than the threshold or asymmetric beta models. For example, for all styles, pseudo-
R2 for regime-switching models exceeds pseudo-R2 for threshold models, and in particular
improves model ﬁt for Convertible Bond Arbitrage, Equity Market Neutral and Event-Driven
Multi-Strategy. Therefore, the regime-switching models are able to capture linkages between
hedge fund returns and the S&P 500 that are not possible to analyze by simply splitting
past returns in diﬀerent return quintiles. Moreover, asymmetric and threshold models have
exogenous deﬁnitions of a state. On the other hand, regime-switching methodology allows
for a ﬂexible endogenous deﬁnition of a state and is able to categorize state distributions in
terms of means and variances. This cannot been done with either asymmetric or threshold
models. Based on this evidence, we conclude that regime-switching methodology is superior
to threshold and asymmetric models for our analysis.
7.3 Data Smoothing Eﬀect
As shown by Getmansky et al. (2004) performance smoothing and illiquidity bias observed
hedge fund returns and lead to autocorrelation of hedge fund returns on monthly basis.
Following Getmansky et al. (2004) approach, we de-smooth returns using the following
procedure:
35Denote by Rt the true economic return of a hedge fund in period t, and let Rt satisfy the
following single linear factor model:
Rt = μ + βΛt +  t , E[Λt]=E [  t]=0 ,  t , Λt ∼ IID (22a)
Var[Rt] ≡ σ
2 . (22b)
True returns represent the ﬂow of information that would determine the equilibrium value
of the fund’s securities in a frictionless market. However, true economic returns are not
observed. Instead, Ro
t denotes the reported or observed return in period t, and let
R
o
t = θ0 Rt + θ1 Rt−1 + ··· + θk Rt−k (23)
θj ∈ [0,1] ,j =0 ,...,k (24)
1=θ0 + θ1 + ··· + θk (25)
which is a weighted average of the fund’s true returns over the most recent k+1 periods,
including the current period. Similar to the Getmansky et al. (2004) model, we estimate
MA(2) model where k=2 using maximum likelihood method.
[INSERT Table (10) about here]
In line with this approach we determine Ro
t, i.e. the “real returns” and estimate our
models on the real returns. The results in Table 10 show that indeed there is evidence of
data smoothing but the estimated exposure to the diﬀerent factors conditional on the states
of the market are largely not aﬀected by the smoothing phenomenon.10
7.4 Single Hedge Funds Exposure
We investigate if the exposure we observe on hedge fund indexes are in line with those we
may ﬁnd for single hedge funds in order to determine the degree of heterogeneity of hedge
10We also estimate the following model for real returns and compare the estimates using the observed
returns: Rt=α(Zt)+β(St)It+
 K
k=1 θkFkt+ω(Zt)ut,I t=μ(St)+σ(St) t. We also show that there is indeed an
evidence of data smoothing; however, the estimated exposure to diﬀerent factors is largely not aﬀected by
smoothing. Results are available on request.
36funds within each index and its eﬀect on factor exposures. We randomly selected diﬀerent
hedge funds for all categories and repeated all analyses described in the paper. Results show
that exposure of single hedge funds to various factors is in line with index exposures.11
7.5 Normality of Residuals Test
One of the reasons for introducing regime-switching approach is to address non-normality
in observed hedge fund index returns. If regime-switching approach accurately describes
return process of hedge fund indexes, then we will expect residuals in the regime-switching
models to be normally distributed. Therefore, we implement Jarque-Bera test, which is
a goodness-of-ﬁt measure of departure from normality, based on the sample kurtosis and
skewness12.
[INSERT Table (11) about here]
Table 11 presents results for the Jarque-Bera normality tests. In the original data, nor-
mality test was rejected for all strategies except Market Neutral strategy13. The residuals
in the OLS regression are normally distributed for three strategies. We then apply regime-
switching methodology. We apply two models: a multifactor model with non-linear exposure
only to the S&P 500 factor presented in equation (15) for which results are contained in Ta-
ble 5 and a multifactor model with non-linear exposure to all factors presented in equation
(17) for which results are presented in Table 6. We observe that for 5 of hedge fund in-
dexes normality test is rejected for a linear model like OLS. There is an improvement using
the regime-switching model based only on the S&P 500 factor loading (normality test is
rejected for 4 out of 8 strategies). Moreover, even if we observe a rejection of normality,
based on p-values, there is a strong improvement in the direction of normality, i.e. Jarque-
Bera statistic is lower than for residuals obtained from the original data in all cases. We
11Detailed results for all models and for all individual hedge funds in each category are available upon
request.




4 ),where S is the skewness, K is
the kurtosis, n is the number of observations, and k is the number of estimated coeﬃcients used to create
the series. The statistic has an asymptotic chi-squared distribution with two degrees of freedom and can be
used to test the null hypothesis that the data are from a normal distribution.
13Market Neutral strategy is the oldest hedge fund strategy. This investment strategy is designed to exploit
equity market ineﬃciencies and usually involves being simultaneously long and short stocks within the same
country. The strategy is not designed to use options or other non-linear instruments.
37see a great improvement in normality of residuals for the more elaborate model which ac-
counts for non-linearity in all factors (equation (17)). Normality is accepted for 6 out of 8
strategies. Therefore, based on the improvement in normality in our results, we showed that
regime-switching models are able to capture non-linear properties of original hedge fund
index series. Nevertheless, there is still space for improvement since for two hedge funds
strategies normality test is still rejected.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we characterized the exposure of hedge fund indexes to risk factors using
switching regime beta models. In line with previous literature, we show that the market risk
factor represented by the S&P500 portfolio is characterized by three regimes: the normal
state, the rolling up and downturn market and that the probabilities to switch from one
regime to the other are quite diﬀerent and depend on the current regime. The analysis for
the sample considered indicate that the likelihood of being in the normal regime is large
for the ﬁrst three yeas and the last two years of the sample. This approach allows us to
analyze time-varying risk exposure and phase-locking phenomenon for hedge funds, and in
particular, the changes in hedge fund exposure to various risk factors conditional on the
diﬀerent market regimes.
We have ﬁve main results. First, hedge funds exhibit signiﬁcant non-linear exposure
not only to the market risk factor but also to Fama and French’s (1993) size and value
factors, bonds, currencies, commodities, volatility, credit and term spreads. In particular,
we show that exposures can be strongly diﬀerent in the down-market and up-market regimes
compared to normal times suggesting that risk exposures of hedge funds in the down-market
regimes are quite diﬀerent than those faced during normal regimes. Moreover, many risk
factor exposures could be captured only with the switching regime analysis because for many
factors the exposures present a phase locking characteristic where in the normal regime the
exposure is zero and in market downturn it is statistically diﬀerent than zero or there is a
change in the sign of the exposure.
Second, we do not ﬁnd a large market factor exposure in the down-market regime for
hedge fund indexes or individual hedge funds, indicating that indeed there is an eﬀort to
control market exposure. However, the exposure of other risk factors like credit spread,
Large-Small, term spread or VIX are found to be large and relevant.
Third, we ﬁnd that the regime switching approach explains the data better than the
asymmetric or the threshold beta approach largely used in the literature and it is robust
38even after controlling for the data smoothing eﬀect.
Fourth, the extension of the regime switching model to allow for non-linearity in residuals
has suggested that switching regime models are able to capture and forecast the evolution of
the idiosyncratic risk factor in terms of changes from a low volatility regime to a distressed
state not directly related to market risk factors. In particular, our analysis shows that the
convertible bond arbitrage distress observed in the recent period is not related to a particular
regime of the market index or some other systemic risk factor, but to a switch in the volatility
of the idiosyncratic risk factor of this category. Our sample is not including much of the
period that has characterized the distress of the Convertible Bond Arbitrage strategy, but
our estimation has allowed to forecast this potential evolution of this strategy highlighting
already at the beginning of 2004 that this strategy may be entering a challenging period.
Moreover, we have allowed for a possibility and found an evidence that all the hedge fund
strategies exhibit idiosyncratic risk in a high volatility regime during the sample considered.
We ﬁnd that for almost all of the sample the joint probability of high idiosyncratic volatility
for all hedge funds is approximately zero but there are three months among the 135 considered
where we ﬁnd that the joint probability that all hedge funds are in the high idiosyncratic
volatility regime is close to 1: at the LTCM crash. This provides an evidence that even after
accounting for market and other factor exposures, the LTCM crisis precipitated contagion
across the hedge fund industry. This is the only crisis event that generated this results, even
though the market was characterized by other crises in the sample considered.
Finally, we investigate if there is any hedge fund exposure that is similar for all the
strategies at least in one regime indicating the possibility for the hedge fund industry to be
aﬀected by the same common factor. Overall hedge fund exposures are quite diﬀerent among
the diﬀerent strategies, however in the market downturn regime six out of eight strategies
are all negatively and signiﬁcantly exposed to the Large-Small risk factor. This feature is
important in light with the results of Acharya and Petersen (2005) that the size risk factor is
well capturing liquidity risk. Moreover, considering that liquidity shocks are highly episodic
and tend to be preceded by or associated with large and negative asset return shocks, whereby
liquidity risk is rendered a particularly non-linear phenomenon our results indeed suggests
that liquidity is a risk factor for hedge fund returns and needs further investigation.











135 0.04 3.24 4.71 -5.29 0.59 3.04 -1.43 6.63  119.96  0.00 
Dedicated Shortseller  135  -0.89 -6.48 17.63 -9.29 -0.95 22.06 0.83  4.84 34.58 0.00 
Emerging Markets  135  0.54 3.12 16.97  -23.68 0.83 15.92 -0.65 7.13  105.21  0.00 
Equity Market 
Neutral
135 0.07 4.08 2.94 -1.68 0.33 2.68 0.14 3.32 1.02 0.60 
Distressed 135  0.24 7.32 6.69 -13.1 0.79 3.58 -2.88  20.67  1942.12  0.00 
Event Driven Multi-
Strategy
135 0.19 4.68 6.17  -12.17  0.45 4.15 -2.72  20.51  1891.51  0.00 
Risk Arb  135  0.12 2.16 4.26 -6.8 0.19 3.19 -1.4 9.95  315.67  0.00
Long/Short Equity  135  0.41 6.12  10.50  -12.08  0.43 12.5 0.19  6.7 77.64  0.00 
S&P 500  135  1.00 5.52  15.10  -15.09  0.97 9.25 -0.59 3.47 9.05 0.01 
Table 1: Summary statistics for monthly CSFT/Tremont hedge-fund index returns from








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































S&P ex-ret probability reg. 2
Figure 1: Market S&P 500 excess returns and probabilities of being in a particular regime
over time. There are 3 states of the market: regime 0 is an up-market regime, regime 1 is a


































































Figure 2: First ﬁgure describes unconditional distribution of S&P 500 overall, in down-
market, up-market and normal regimes. Second ﬁgure describes conditional distribution of
S&P 500 given a down-market regime, for the overall, down-market, up-market and normal
regimes. There are 3 states of the market: regime 0 is an up-market regime, regime 1 is a
normal regime and regime 2 is a down-market regime.















































































Figure 3: First ﬁgure describes conditional distribution of S&P 500 given an up-market
regime, for the overall, down-market, up-market and normal regimes. Second ﬁgure describes
conditional distribution of S&P 500 given a normal regime, for the overall, down-market,
up-market and normal regimes. There are 3 states of the market: regime 0 is an up-market









































































































































Figure 4: The evolution of market betas for Hedge fund index, Long/Short Equity and Risk






























































































































































Figure 5: The evolution of market betas for Emerging Markets, Equity Market Neutral and




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6: Part A. The evolution of the probability of being in the high volatility regime
for the idiosyncratic risk factor from January 1994 to March 2005 for Convertible Bond














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6: Part B. The evolution of the probability of being in the high volatility regime for
the idiosyncratic risk factor from January 1994 to March 2005 for Long/Short Equity, Event
Driven Multi-Strategy and Risk Arbitrage.




















































Figure 7: Probability of all hedge fund indexes being in the high volatility state of the
idiosyncratic factor. Eight hedge fund strategies are considered: Convertible Bond Arbi-
trage, Long/Short Equity, Emerging Markets, Equity Market Neutral, Event Driven Multi-
Strategy, Distressed, Dedicated Shortbias and Risk Arbitrage.








P 0.05 1.17 
P 0.67 4.18
P 0.02 0.94 
P 0.98 43.45
P 0.00 0.00 
P 0.26 2.21
P 0.00 0.00 
P 0.74 6.54
Table 2: Regime switching model for the market risk factor, S&P 500. The following model
is estimated: It=μ(St)+σ(St) t.μ i and σi are mean and standard deviation of regime i,
respectively. Pij denotes transition probability from regime i to regime j. Parameters that
are signiﬁcant at the 10% level are shown in bold type.
49Variable/
Strategy
D 0.75 7.28 0.32 11.95 1.12 4.78 0.31 4.37
D -0.57 -2.79 -0.13 -0.48 -0.09 -0.16 0.16 1.10
E0 (SP) 0.02 0.84 -0.67 -43.38 0.16 1.56 0.11 3.42
E1 (SP) 0.06 1.48 -1.26 -61.16 0.41 2.80 0.07 1.62
E2 (SP) -0.02 -0.92 -0.78 -238.32 0.50 8.57 0.03 1.50
Z 0.51 9.17 0.04 5.77 1.63 10.50 0.58 19.90
Z 1.75 8.93 3.37 16.60 5.27 15.21 0.97 14.82
p
Z
00 0.88 44.04 0.37 1.86 0.98 40.56 0.99 194.28
p
Z
11 0.83 17.58 0.97 62.26 1.00 7.65E+06 1.00 1.32E+06
PseudoR
2
0.10 0.12 0.09 0.07
Variable/
Strategy
D -0.10 -0.88 0.68 6.73 0.52 6.27 0.21 2.58
D 1.09 2.29 -3.84 -81.92 -3.99 -1.43 -0.25 -0.64
E0 (SP) 0.18 2.30 0.09 1.76 0.14 2.35 0.09 2.48
E1 (SP) 0.64 12.71 0.37 9.26 0.14 2.71 0.14 3.39
E2 (SP) 0.23 4.49 0.13 3.22 0.17 3.99 0.06 1.67
Z 1.24 13.71 1.18 22.59 1.13 26.56 0.68 12.30
Z 3.88 8.74 3.78 2.73 3.44 2.32 1.85 4.63
p
Z
00 0.99 184.05 0.98 141.58 0.99 231.66 0.89 18.36
p
Z
11 0.97 58.47 0.51 11.30 0.77 6.76 0.66 4.24
PseudoR
2
0.13 0.12 0.12 0.08
Estimate       t-stat
Equity Market Neutral Convertible Bond Arb Dedicated Shortseller Emerging Markets
Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat
Long/Short Equity Distressed Event Driven Multi-
Strategy
Risk Arb
Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat
Table 3: The exposure of CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index strategies to diﬀerent S&P 500
regimes. The following model is estimated: Rt=α(Zt)+β(St)It+ω(Zt)ut,It=μ(St)+σ(St) t.
Parameters that are signiﬁcant at the 10% level are shown in bold type.
50Variable Abbreviation Definition
S&P500 SP Monthly return of the S&P 500 index including dividends
Large-Small LS Monthly return difference between Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 indexes
Value-Growth VG Monthly return difference between Russell 1000 Value and Growth indexes
USD USD Monthly return on Bank of England Trade Weighted Index
Lehman Government Credit L.GC Monthly return of the Lehman U.S. Aggregated Government/Credit index
Term Spread TS 10-year T Bond minus 6-month LIBOR
Change in VIX dVIX Monthly change in implied volatility based on the CBOE's OEX options.
Credit Spread CS The difference between BAA and AAA indexes provide by Moody's
Gold Gold Monthly return using gold bullion $/Troy Oz. Price
MSCI Emergent Bond MSCIEmD Monthly return of the MSCI Emergent Markets Bond Index
MSCI Emergent Stock MSCIEMS Monthly return of the MSCI Emergent Markets Stock Index
Momentum Factor UMD Momentum factor (source: Ken French website)
Table 4: Deﬁnitions of aggregate measures of market conditions and risk factors. All variables




D 0.79 11.43 0.11 0.53 0.73 4.70 0.29 5.42
D -0.38 -2.02 0.31 0.95 0.18 1.25
E0 (SP) 0.04 1.91 -0.87 -9.31 0.24 2.96 0.11 3.34
E1 (SP) 0.02 0.42 -1.09 -9.97 0.13 1.49 0.05 1.04
E2 (SP) 0.01 0.70 -0.77 -5.21 0.39 5.90 0.03 1.09
T1 (LS) -0.05 -4.21 0.47 9.91 -0.14 -2.57
T2  (VG) 0.05 4.79 0.24 3.52
T3 (USD) 0.32 2.81 0.27 4.31
T4 (L.GC) 0.13 4.15 0.57 5.48 0.09 1.89
T5 (TS) 0.65 3.16
T6 (dVIX)
T7 (CS) -1.77 -9.03 -0.73 -81.41
T8 (Gold) 0.08 2.39
T (MSCIEMD) 0.25 2.15
T (MSCIEMS) 0.21 6.81 0.02 1.83
T11 (UMD) 0.09 2.71
Z 0.34 9.53 2.47 22.75 1.08 12.53 0.56 22.02
Z 1.65 10.75 4.52 13.49 0.95 16.17
p
Z
00 0.85 28.96 0.98 73.20 0.99 198.51
p
Z
11 0.85 26.95 1.00 5.06E+05 1.00 4.65E+05
PseudoR
2
0.13 0.18 0.16 0.08
Estimate       t-stat
Emerging Markets
Estimate       t-stat
Equity Market Neutral Convertible Bond Arb
Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat
Dedicated Shortseller
Table 5: Part A. The exposure of CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index strategies to dif-
ferent S&P 500 regimes and other market factors. The following model is estimated:
Rt=α(Zt)+β(St)It+
 K
k=1 θkFkt+ω(Zt)ut,It=μ(St)+σ(St) t. Hedge fund returns, S&P 500,
USD, Lehman Government Credit and Gold are used in excess of LIBOR returns. Parame-
ters that are signiﬁcant at the 10% level are shown in bold type.
52Variable/
Strategy
D -0.16 -1.71 0.73 5.88 0.53 5.70 0.06 0.76
D 0.63 1.32 -3.68 -1.94 0.48 2.52
E0 (SP) 0.59 10.22 0.08 1.51 0.26 6.28 0.09 2.69
E1 (SP) 0.51 12.76 0.30 4.82 0.10 1.79 0.15 3.29
E2 (SP) 0.49 11.39 0.39 3.22 0.23 5.72 0.17 4.72
T1 (LS) -0.35 -9.98 -0.18 -4.71 -0.14 -6.68 -0.14 -7.03
T2  (VG) 0.11 2.37 0.04 1.81 0.07 3.92
T3 (USD) 0.32 4.49
T4 (L.GC) 0.23 3.69 0.23 2.91
T5 (TS) -0.30 -2.64
T6 (dVIX) 0.12 3.50 0.06 2.28
T7 (CS) -2.27 -40.34 -2.69 -2.12 -2.43 -7.77
T8 (Gold)
T (MSCIEMD) -0.13 -1.75 0.20 2.72
T (MSCIEMS) 0.05 4.10
T11 (UMD) 0.17 8.13 0.05 3.52
Z 1.03 21.68 1.37 12.16 0.89 24.60 0.74 16.57
Z 2.56 6.74 3.70 4.02 1.29 5.27
p
Z
00 0.99 140.29 0.99 243.40 0.99 111.29
p
Z
11 0.94 31.39 0.72 4.29 0.96 32.51
PseudoR
2
0.25 0.11 0.20 0.13
Long/Short Equity Distressed Event Driven Multi-
Strategy
Risk Arb
Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat
Table 5: Part B. The exposure of CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index strategies to dif-
ferent S&P 500 regimes and other market factors. The following model is estimated:
Rt=α(Zt)+β(St)It+
 K
k=1 θkFkt+ω(Zt)ut,It=μ(St)+σ(St) t. Hedge fund returns, S&P 500,
USD, Lehman Government Credit and Gold are used in excess of LIBOR returns. Parame-
ters that are signiﬁcant at the 10% level are shown in bold type.
53Variable/
Strategy
D 0.74 10.63 -0.25 -1.96 0.53 3.44 0.58 3.84
D -0.37 -2.01 0.41 0.92 0.05 0.52
E0 (SP) 0.05 2.08 -0.82 -8.62 0.29 1.75 0.12 2.74
E1 (SP) 0.05 0.82 -0.91 -9.58 -0.13 -1.25 0.08 2.04
E2 (SP) 0.01 0.63 -0.79 -6.80 0.42 6.30 0.03 1.40
T1_0 (LS) -0.02 -0.95 0.24 2.96 0.04 0.21
T1_1 (LS) 0.00 -0.04 0.92 10.47 -0.19 -1.79
T1_2 (LS) -0.09 -4.60 0.43 5.98 -0.21 -2.75
T2_0  (VG) 0.07 2.27 -0.11 -1.15
T2_1  (VG) 0.04 0.61 0.77 5.13
T2_2  (VG) 0.06 5.04 0.24 3.28
T3_0 (USD) 0.55 4.26 0.57 2.21
T3_1 (USD) -0.27 -1.05 -0.03 -0.28
T3_2 (USD) 0.24 2.56 0.33 3.82
T4_0 (L.GC) 0.18 2.61 1.39 4.51 0.32 1.51
T4_1 (L.GC) 0.03 0.33 0.58 5.88 -0.04 -0.36
T4_2 (L.GC) 0.13 2.49 0.47 2.27 0.07 0.70
T5_0 (TS) 0.86 2.58
T5_1 (TS) 0.47 1.70




T7_0 (CS) -2.10 -12.51 0.36 113.07
T7_1 (CS) 0.87 29.14 -6.42 -464.06




T9_0 (MSCIEMD) 0.17 1.17
T9_1 (MSCIEMD) -0.44 -1.67
T9_2 (MSCIEMD) 0.32 3.59
T10_0 (MSCIEMS) 0.44 4.08 0.04 1.69
T10_1 (MSCIEMS) 0.32 6.81 0.00 0.16
T10_2 (MSCIEMS) 0.08 1.62 0.03 1.59
T11_0 (UMD) 0.17 1.95
T11_1 (UMD) -0.02 -0.38
T11_2 (UMD) 0.06 1.35
Z 0.31 6.05 2.29 20.91 0.94 11.38 0.47 3.78
Z 1.65 9.13 4.43 13.66 0.80 8.35
p
Z
00 0.85 31.29 0.98 102.81 0.93 27.27
p
Z
11 0.86 17.86 1.00 1.95E+05 0.97 70.10
PseudoR
2
0.14 0.2 0.17 0.09
Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat
Convertible Bond Arb Dedicated Shortseller Emerging Markets Equity Market Neutral
Table 6: Part A. The exposure of CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index strategies to diﬀer-
ent S&P 500 regimes and regimes of other market factors. The following model is esti-
mated: Rt=α(Zt)+β(St)It+
 K
k=1 θk(St)Fkt+ω(Zt)ut,It=μ(St)+σ(St) t. Hedge fund returns,
S&P 500, USD, Lehman Government Credit and Gold are used in excess of LIBOR returns.
Parameters that are signiﬁcant at the 10% level are shown in bold type.
54Variable/
Strategy
D -0.12 -1.42 0.72 5.77 0.42 5.30 0.26 3.17
D 0.68 8.21 -3.75 -1.26 0.17 2.02
E0 (SP) 0.73 8.19 0.11 1.71 0.35 7.98 0.06 3.29
E1 (SP) 0.56 11.87 0.25 4.25 0.15 2.55 0.17 9.23
E2 (SP) 0.38 9.89 0.40 2.76 0.13 3.76 0.20 20.21
T1_0 (LS) -0.61 -8.01 -0.21 -4.69 -0.16 -4.76 0.01 0.72
T1_1 (LS) -0.37 -5.77 -0.13 -3.39 -0.07 -1.38 -0.01 -0.21
T1_2 (LS) -0.27 -5.24 -0.18 -2.48 -0.13 -4.16 -0.17 -20.39
T2_0  (VG) 0.14 2.07 0.12 7.57
T2_1  (VG) 0.02 0.25 -0.21 -8.98
T2_2  (VG) 0.12 1.46 0.10 7.39
T3_0 (USD) 0.16 2.86
T3_1 (USD) 0.14 1.85
T3_2 (USD) 0.08 1.28
T4_0 (L.GC) 0.13 0.67 0.52 3.37
T4_1 (L.GC) 0.09 0.98 0.12 1.71
T4_2 (L.GC) 0.34 2.86 0.23 3.34
T5_0 (TS) -0.60 -1.75
T5_1 (TS) -0.56 -3.72
T5_2 (TS) 0.04 0.15
T6_0 (dVIX) 0.28 3.82 0.22 5.78
T6_1 (dVIX) 0.12 2.18 0.04 0.62
T6_2 (dVIX) -0.02 -0.45 -0.02 -0.56
T7_0 (CS) 3.66 326.28 -5.48 -474.45 -0.80 -0.53
T7_1 (CS) -1.78 -238.74 -3.92 -634.87 -2.48 -1.13




T9_0 (MSCIEMD) -0.46 -2.94
T9_1 (MSCIEMD) 0.05 1.05
T9_2 (MSCIEMD) -0.13 -1.74
T10_0 (MSCIEMS) 0.02 0.53
T10_1 (MSCIEMS) 0.05 1.38
T10_2 (MSCIEMS) 0.06 3.12
T11_0 (UMD) 0.24 5.26 0.03 1.11
T11_1 (UMD) -0.04 -0.80 -0.01 -0.21
T11_2 (UMD) 0.16 5.10 0.04 1.95
Z 0.90 19.10 1.34 8.93 0.88 18.60 0.06 3.48
Z 2.43 7.50 3.63 3.15 1.03 17.94
p
Z
00 0.99 234.44 0.99 137.03 0.36 1.60
p
Z
11 0.94 27.15 0.71 2.42 0.85 12.48
PseudoR
2
0.28 0.12 0.21 0.17
Long/Short Equity Distressed Event Driven Multi-
Strategy
Risk Arb
Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat
Table 6: Part B. The exposure of CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index strategies to diﬀer-
ent S&P 500 regimes and regimes of other market factors. The following model is esti-
mated: Rt=α(Zt)+β(St)It+
 K
k=1 θk(St)Fkt+ω(Zt)ut,It=μ(St)+σ(St) t. Hedge fund returns,
S&P 500, USD, Lehman Government Credit and Gold are used in excess of LIBOR returns.
Parameters that are signiﬁcant at the 10% level are shown in bold type.
55Variable/
Strategy
D 0.77 11.25 -0.16 -0.75 0.63 6.20 0.02 0.23
D -0.38 -2.05 0.15 1.65
E0 (SP) 0.07 2.21 -1.02 -8.01 0.18 2.73 0.15 3.15
E1 (SP) 0.05 0.87 -1.01 -9.47 0.36 9.94 0.20 3.30
E2 (SP) -0.03 -1.12 -0.57 -4.83 0.22 3.60 0.13 2.76
T1_0 (LS) -0.02 -0.94 0.27 1.75 -0.23 -5.13 -0.13 -1.74
T1_1 (LS) 0.01 0.32 0.99 9.78 -0.19 -3.91 -0.13 -2.91
T1_2 (LS) -0.08 -4.65 0.37 5.05 -0.13 -1.81 -0.18 -3.87
T2_0  (VG) 0.07 2.18 -0.25 -2.07 0.17 4.71 0.17 2.97
T2_1  (VG) 0.06 0.89 0.73 4.08 0.05 1.95 -0.09 -1.24
T2_2  (VG) 0.07 4.49 0.27 4.04 0.09 1.37 0.10 2.36
T3_0 (USD) 1.42 2.44
T3_1 (USD) -0.36 -1.42
T3_2 (USD) 0.12 0.29
T4_0 (L.GC) 0.14 1.71 0.48 3.12
T4_1 (L.GC) 0.00 -0.05 0.22 2.44




T6_0 (dVIX) 0.05 1.79 -0.42 -2.69 0.04 0.53 0.01 0.26
T6_1 (dVIX) -0.04 -1.20 -0.27 -2.22 0.24 3.33 0.13 2.42
T6_2 (dVIX) -0.08 -2.98 0.27 2.15 -0.22 -4.06 -0.09 -1.66
T7_0 (CS) -2.02 -12.07 -1.97 -0.26 -5.22 -97.42
T7_1 (CS) 0.40 4.59 -4.96 -8.54 -5.71 -106.57




T9_0 (MSCIEMD) 1.10 1.75 -0.48 -5.34
T9_1 (MSCIEMD) -0.42 -1.53 -0.07 -0.71







Z 0.31 5.72 2.22 21.14 1.29 10.74 0.36 6.21
Z 1.61 10.80 0.94 14.42
p
Z
00 0.85 27.87 0.96 23.20
p
Z
11 0.86 21.39 1.00 3.58E+05
PseudoR
2
0.15 0.21 0.13 0.16
Distressed Risk Arb
Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat
Convertible Bond Arb Dedicated Short Bias
Estimate       t-stat
Table 7: The exposure of Convertible Bond Arbitrage, Dedicated Shortseller, Distressed and
Risk Arbitrage strategies to diﬀerent S&P 500 regimes and regimes of other market factors
analyzed in Table 6 and the additional change in VIX factor. The following model is esti-
mated: Rt=α(Zt)+β(St)It+
 K
k=1 θk(St)Fkt+ω(Zt)ut,It=μ(St)+σ(St) t. Hedge fund returns,
S&P 500, USD, Lehman Government Credit and Gold are used in excess of LIBOR returns.
Parameters that are signiﬁcant at the 10% level are shown in bold type.
56Variable/
Strategy
a0 0.23 2.04 -0.10 -0.48 0.32 3.24 0.31 4.68
b0 (SP) 0.06 1.30 -0.85 -10.47 0.59 7.46 0.07 4.04
b1 (LS) -0.08 -1.93 0.49 6.18 -0.22 -3.18
b2  (VG) 0.04 1.06 0.23 3.60
b3 (USD) 0.22 1.05 0.54 4.89
b4 (L.GC) 0.16 1.87 0.37 3.39 0.09 1.78
b5 (TS) 1.37 3.36
b6 (dVIX)
b7 (CS) -0.97 -0.73 -0.31 -40.05
b8 (Gold) 0.12 1.69
b9 (MSCIEMD) 0.11 0.58
b10(MSCIEMS) 0.25 4.88 0.02 1.46
b11 (UMD) 0.20 4.08
w0 1.30 10.20 2.49 21.27 3.32 22.03 0.77 15.42
Adj. R
2 0.04 0.75 0.51 0.14
Pseudo R
2
0.02 0.18 0.10 0.04
Variable/
Strategy
a0 0.01 0.09 0.46 3.05 0.32 1.96 0.09 1.02
b0 (SP) 0.57 12.40 0.29 4.20 0.23 4.82 0.17 4.84
b1 (LS) -0.39 -9.85 -0.19 -4.38 -0.15 -4.04 -0.16 -4.86
b2  (VG) 0.11 2.29 0.10 2.08 0.08 3.03
b3 (USD) 0.22 1.78
b4 (L.GC) 0.14 3.19 0.24 2.54
b5 (TS) -0.23 -1.68
b6 (dVIX) 0.09 1.66 -0.02 -0.37
b7 (CS) -4.21 -360.44 -3.37 -2.79 -3.75 -3.90
b8 (Gold)
b9 (MSCIEMD) -0.15 -2.75 0.03 0.24
b10(MSCIEMS) 0.06 2.15
b11 (UMD) 0.23 7.83 0.07 2.77
w0 1.36 16.00 1.42 6.22 1.27 6.96 0.93 12.74
Adj. R
2 0.79 0.43 0.46 0.41
Pseudo R
2
0.23 0.10 0.11 0.11
Estimate       t-stat
Emerging Markets
Estimate       t-stat
Equity Market Neutral Convertible Bond Arb
Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat
Dedicated Shortseller
Long/Short Equity Distressed Event Driven Multi-
Strategy
Risk Arb
Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat
Table 8: The exposure of CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index strategies to diﬀerent S&P 500
regimes. The following OLS model is estimated: Rt=α(Zt)+ βIt+
 K
k=1 θkFkt+ωt. Hedge
fund returns, S&P 500, USD, Lehman Government Credit and Gold are used in excess of
LIBOR returns. Parameters that are signiﬁcant at the 10% level are shown in bold type.
57Variable/
Strategy
D 0.31 2.40 -0.29 -0.81 0.45 1.15 0.25 3.37
E 0.03 0.39 -0.81 -8.84 0.34 3.03 0.13 4.45
E 0.00 -0.02 -0.87 -5.78 0.47 2.50 0.02 0.60
E 0.06 0.81 -0.97 -6.94 0.73 3.73 0.05 2.15
Adj.R
2 0.00 0.58 0.23 0.17
PseudoR
2
0.00 0.11 0.04 0.05
Variable/
Strategy
D 0.36 1.65 0.84 5.71 0.55 3.79 0.24 2.08
E 0.35 3.06 0.07 1.46 0.08 1.45 0.06 1.62
E 0.49 4.72 0.22 4.33 0.15 2.63 0.13 2.29
E 0.42 4.69 0.38 2.82 0.30 2.18 0.17 2.21
Adj.R
2 0.33 0.35 0.25 0.22
PseudoR
2
0.06 0.08 0.05 0.05
Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat
Long/Short Equity Distressed Event Driven Multi-
Strategy
Risk Arb
Estimate       t-stat
Equity Market Neutral Convertible Bond Arb Dedicated Shortseller Emerging Markets
Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat Estimate       t-stat
Table 9: Regressions of monthly CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index returns on three regimes











t +  it, where I
+
t = μ+σ,I0
t = μ−σ<I t <μ+σ,I
−
t = μ+σ. It is the return
on the index, μ is the mean and σ is its standard deviation. Parameters that are signiﬁcant
at the 10% level are shown in bold type.
58Variable/
Strategy
D 0.74 0.42 -0.25 1.32 0.53 0.36 0.58 0.26
D -0.37 0.04 0.41 -0.03 0.05 -0.14
E0 (SP) 0.05 0.06 -0.82 0.07 0.29 0.45 0.12 0.15
E1 (SP) 0.05 0.04 -0.91 -0.59 -0.13 0.06 0.08 0.08
E2 (SP) 0.01 0.04 -0.79 -0.06 0.42 0.48 0.03 0.04
T1_0 (LS) -0.02 -0.08 0.24 -0.27 0.04 -0.02
T1_1 (LS) 0.00 0.06 0.92 0.70 -0.19 -0.20
T1_2 (LS) -0.09 -0.10 0.43 0.76 -0.21 -0.22
T2_0  (VG) 0.07 0.10 -0.11 -0.55 0.10
T2_1  (VG) 0.04 0.01 0.77 0.88 0.03
T2_2  (VG) 0.06 0.06 0.24 -0.03 -0.01
T3_0 (USD) 0.55 -0.63 0.57 0.48
T3_1 (USD) -0.27 -0.02 -0.03 0.04
T3_2 (USD) 0.24 -1.27 0.33 0.33
T4_0 (L.GC) 0.18 0.13 1.39 0.89 0.32
T4_1 (L.GC) 0.03 -0.02 0.58 0.61 -0.04
T4_2 (L.GC) 0.13 0.14 0.47 0.75 0.07
T5_0 (TS) 0.86 0.24
T5_1 (TS) 0.47 0.45




T7_0 (CS) -2.10 0.04 0.36 14.94
T7_1 (CS) 0.87 -1.93 -6.42 -19.15




T9_0 (MSCIEMD) 0.17 0.58
T9_1 (MSCIEMD) -0.44 -0.43
T9_2 (MSCIEMD) 0.32 -1.29
T10_0 (MSCIEMS) 0.44 0.16 0.04 0.01
T10_1 (MSCIEMS) 0.32 0.24 0.00 0.00
T10_2 (MSCIEMS) 0.08 -0.03 0.03 0.02
T11_0 (UMD) 0.17 0.15
T11_1 (UMD) -0.02 0.01
T11_2 (UMD) 0.06 -0.01
Z 0.31 0.31 2.29 5.13 0.94 1.10 0.47 0.42
Z 1.65 1.33 4.43 4.33 0.80 0.80
p
Z
00 0.85 0.84 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.93
p
Z
11 0.86 0.88 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.98
PseudoR
2
0.14 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.09 0.11
  Observed      Real    Observed      Real    Observed      Real    Observed      Real 
Convertible Bond Arb Dedicated Shortseller Emerging Markets Equity Market Neutral
Table 10. Part A. The exposure of CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index strategies
to diﬀerent S&P 500 regimes and regimes of other market factors for both ob-
served and real hedge fund index returns. The following model is estimated:
Rt=α(Zt)+β(St)It+
 K
k=1 θk(St)Fkt+ω(Zt)ut,It=μ(St)+σ(St) t. Hedge fund returns, S&P
500, USD, Lehman Government Credit and Gold are used in excess of LIBOR returns.
Real returns are obtained by using MA(2) estimation via maximum likelihood. Parameters
that are signiﬁcant at the 10% level are shown in bold type.
59Variable/
Strategy
D -0.12 -0.54 0.72 0.29 0.42 -0.70 0.26 0.02
D 0.68 -0.04 -3.75 0.21 0.17
E0 (SP) 0.73 0.68 0.11 0.10 0.35 0.31 0.06 0.10
E1 (SP) 0.56 0.56 0.25 0.22 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.10
E2 (SP) 0.38 0.31 0.40 0.40 0.13 0.17 0.20 0.20
T1_0 (LS) -0.61 -0.62 -0.21 -0.19 -0.16 -0.23 0.01 -0.15
T1_1 (LS) -0.37 -0.37 -0.13 -0.12 -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 -0.05
T1_2 (LS) -0.27 -0.24 -0.18 -0.16 -0.13 -0.13 -0.17 -0.19
T2_0  (VG) -0.06 0.14 0.05 0.12 0.11
T2_1  (VG) 0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.21 -0.13
T2_2  (VG) -0.08 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.08
T3_0 (USD) 0.16 0.26
T3_1 (USD) 0.14 0.02
T3_2 (USD) 0.08 0.05
T4_0 (L.GC) 0.13 0.23 0.52 0.63
T4_1 (L.GC) 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.10
T4_2 (L.GC) 0.34 0.39 0.23 0.34
T5_0 (TS) -0.60 -0.71
T5_1 (TS) -0.56 -0.36
T5_2 (TS) 0.04 0.08
T6_0 (dVIX) 0.28 0.19 0.22 0.17
T6_1 (dVIX) 0.12 0.07 0.04 -0.03
T6_2 (dVIX) -0.02 -0.08 -0.02 -0.04
T7_0 (CS) 3.66 -5.48 -3.19 -0.80 0.70
T7_1 (CS) -1.78 -3.92 -2.93 -2.48 -2.98




T9_0 (MSCIEMD) -0.46 -0.16
T9_1 (MSCIEMD) 0.05 0.07
T9_2 (MSCIEMD) -0.13 -0.14
T10_0 (MSCIEMS) 0.02 -0.01
T10_1 (MSCIEMS) 0.05 0.01
T10_2 (MSCIEMS) 0.06 0.02
T11_0 (UMD) 0.24 0.26 0.03 0.01
T11_1 (UMD) -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 0.01
T11_2 (UMD) 0.16 0.17 0.04 0.04
Z 0.90 0.85 1.34 1.24 0.88 0.79 0.06 0.86
Z 2.43 2.17 3.63 2.25 1.03
p
Z
00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.87 0.36
p
Z
11 0.94 0.94 0.71 0.98 0.85
PseudoR
2
0.28 0.27 0.12 0.15 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.16
Long/Short Equity Distressed Event Driven Multi-
Strategy
Risk Arb
  Observed      Real    Observed      Real    Observed      Real    Observed      Real 
Table 10: Part B. The exposure of CSFB/Tremont hedge-fund index strategies
to diﬀerent S&P 500 regimes and regimes of other market factors for both ob-
served and real hedge fund index returns. The following model is estimated:
Rt=α(Zt)+β(St)It+
 K
k=1 θk(St)Fkt+ω(Zt)ut,It=μ(St)+σ(St) t. Hedge fund returns, S&P
500, USD, Lehman Government Credit and Gold are used in excess of LIBOR returns.
Real returns are obtained by using MA(2) estimation via maximum likelihood. Parameters
that are signiﬁcant at the 10% level are shown in bold type.
60Strategy/Model
Convertible Bond Arb. 119.97 0.00 65.54 0.00 48.15 0.00 45.64 0.00
Dedicated Shortseller 34.58 0.00 2.98 0.20 3.58 0.17 5.71 0.06
Emerging Markets 105.21 0.00 18.75 0.00 18.13 0.00 5.69 0.06
Equity Market Neutral 1.02 0.60 0.16 0.80 1.22 0.54 1.23 0.54
Long/Short Equity 77.64 0.00 0.14 0.80 2.11 0.35 2.38 0.30
Distressed 1942.12 0.00 333.67 0.00 126.52 0.00 135.19 0.00
Event Driven M.S. 1891.51 0.00 836.27 0.00 2.56 0.28 4.39 0.11
Risk Arbitrage 315.67 0.00 109.01 0.00 9.26 0.01 4.54 0.10
Table 6
JB statistic      p-value JB statistic      p-value JB statistic      p-value JB statistic      p-value
Original Data OLS Table 5
Table 11: Jarque-Bera statistics and corresponding p-values for Central-
ized Normalized Hedge, Filtered Residuals and Smoothed Residuals for all
hedge fund indexes. Panel A uses the following regime-switching model:
Rt=α(Zt)+β(St)It+
 K




Jarque-Bera test statistics that lead to rejection of normality of residuals are shown in bold.
For these tests, p-value is equal or smaller than 0.05.
61References
Acharya V. and S. Schaefer, 2006, “Liquidity Risk and Correlation Risk: Impli-
cations for Risk Management”, London Business School Working Paper.
Acharya V. and H. Pedersen, 2004, “Asset Pricing with Liquidity Risk”, Jour-
nal of Financial Economics 77, 2, 375–410.
Ackermann, C., McEnally, R. and D. Ravenscraft, 1999, “The Performance
of Hedge Funds: Risk, Return, and Incentives”, Journal of Finance 54,
833–874.
Agarwal, V. and N. Naik, 2000a, “Performance Evaluation of Hedge Funds
with Buy-and-Hold and Option-Based Strategies”, Hedge Fund Centre
Working Paper No. HF–003, London Business School.
Agarwal, V. and N. Naik, 2000b, “On Taking the ‘Alternative’ Route: The
Risks, Rewards, and Performance Persistence of Hedge Funds”, Journal
of Alternative Investments 2, 6–23.
Agarwal, V. and N. Naik, 2000c, “Multi-Period Performance Persistence Anal-
ysis of Hedge Funds Source”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Anal-
ysis 35, 327–342.
Agarwal, V. and N. Naik, 2000d, “Generalized Style Analysis of Hedge Funds”,
Journal of Asset Management 1, 93–109.
Agarwal, V. and N. Naik, 2004, “Risks and Portfolio Decisions Involving Hedge
Funds”, Review of Financial Studies 17, 63–98.
Agarwal, A., Daniel, N. and N. Naik, 2004, “Flows, Performance and Manage-
rial Incentives in Hedge Funds”, Working Paper, Georgia State Univer-
sity.
Alexander, C., and A. Dimitriu, 2005, “Indexing, Cointegration and Equity
Market Regimes”, International Journal of Finance and Economics 10,
1–10.
Allen F. and D. Gale, 1994, “Liquidity Preference, Market Participation and
Asset Price Volatility”, American Economic Review 84, 933–955.
Allen F. and D. Gale, 1998, “Optimal Financial Crisis”, Journal of Finance
53, 1245–1284.
Ang, A. and G. Bekaert, 2002, “International Asset Allocation With Regime
Shifts”, The Review of Financial Studies 15, 4, 1137–1187.
Ang, A. and G. Bekaert, 2004, “How Regimes Aﬀect Asset Allocation”, Fi-
nancial Analysts Journal 60, 86–99.
62Asness, C., Krail, R. and J. Liew, 2001, “Do Hedge Funds Hedge?”, The
Journal of Portfolio Management 28, 6–19.
Bae, K., Karolyi, G. and R. Stulz, 2003, “A New Approach to Measuring
Financial Contation”, The Review of Financial Studies 16, 717–763.
Bali, T., Gokcan, S. and B. Liang, 2005, “Value at Risk and the Cross-Section
of Hedge Fund Returns”, Journal of Banking and Finance (Forthcoming).
Bekaert, G. and C. Harvey, 1995, “Time-Varying World Market Integration”,
The Journal of Finance 50, 2, 403–444.
Billio, M and L. Pelizzon, 2000, “Value-at-Risk: A Multivariate Switching
Regime Approach”, Journal of Empirical Finance 7, 531–554.
Boyson, N., Stahel, C. and R. Stulz, 2006, “Is There Hedge Fund Contagion?”,
Northeastern University Working Paper.
Brealey, R. and E. Kapalanis, 2001, “Hedge Funds and Financial Stability: An
Analysis of Their Factor Exposures,” Journal of International Finance 4,
161-187.
Brooks, C. and G. Persand, 2001, “The Trading Proﬁtability of Forecasts of the
Gilt-Equity Yield Ratio,” Journal of International Forecasting 17, 11–29.
Brown, S. J. and J. F. Spitzer, 2006, “Caught by the Tail: Tail Risk Neutrality
and Hedge Fund Returns,” Working Paper, New York University.
Chan, N., Getmansky, M., Haas, S. and A. Lo., 2005, “Systemic Risk and
Hedge Funds”, NBER Book On Risks of Financial Institutions, Topic:
Systemic Risk.
Dueker, M. and C.J. Neely, 2004, “Can Markov Switching Models Predict
Excess Foreign Exchange Returns?” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Working Paper 2001-021B.
Edwards, F. and M. Caglayan, 2001, “Hedge Fund Performance and Manager
Skill,” Journal of Futures Markets 21, 1003-1028.
Ferson, W., Kandel, S. and R. Stambaugh, 1987, “Tests of Asset Pricing with
Time-Varying Expected Risk Premiums and Market Betas”, The Journal
of Finance 42, 2, 201–220.
Forbes, K. and R. Rigobon, 2002, “No Contagion, Only Interdependence: Mea-
suring Stock Market Co-Movements”, The Journal of Finance 57, 5, 2223–
2261.
Francq, C. and Zakoan, J.-M., 1998, “Estimating Linear Representations of
Nonlinear Processes”, Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference 68,
145–65.
63Francq, C. and Zakoan, J.-M., 2001, “Stationarity of Multivariate Markov-
switching ARMA Models”, Journal of Econometrics 102, 339–64.
Fung, W. and D. Hsieh, 1997a, “Empirical Characteristics of Dynamic Trading
Strategies: The Case of Hedge Funds”, Review of Financial Studies 10,
275–302.
Fung, W. and D. Hsieh, 1997b, “Investment Style and Survivorship Bias in the
Returns of CTAs: The Information Content of Track Records”, Journal
of Portfolio Management 24, 30–41.
Fung, W. and D. Hsieh, 1999, “A Primer on Hedge Funds”, Journal of Empir-
ical Finance 6, 309–31.
Fung, W. and D. Hsieh, 2000, “Performance Characteristics of Hedge Funds
and Commodity Funds: Natural versus Spurious Biases”, Journal of Fi-
nancial and Quantitative Analysis 35, 291–307.
Fung, W. and D. Hsieh, 2000, “Measuring the Market Impact of Hedge Funds”,
Journal of Empirical Finance 7, 1–36.
Fung, W. and D. Hsieh, 2001, “The Risk in Hedge Fund Strategies: Theory
and Evidence from Trend Followers”, Review of Financial Studies 14, 313–
341.
Fung, W. and D. Hsieh, 2002a, “Asset-Based Style Factors for Hedge Funds”,
Financial Analysts Journal 58, 16–27.
Fung, W. and D. Hsieh, 2002b “Benchmarks of Hedge Fund Performance:
Information Content and Measurement Biases”, Journal of Alternative
Investments 58, 22–34.
Fung, W. and D. Hsieh, 2004 “Hedge Fund Benchmarks: A Risk Based Ap-
proach”, Financial Analyst Journal (Forthcoming).
Garcia, R., 1998 “Asymptotic Null Distribution of the Likelihood Ratio Test in
Markov Switching Models”, International Economic Review 39, 763–88.
Getmansky, M., Lo, A. and I. Makarov, 2004, “An Econometric Analysis of
Serial Correlation and Illiquidity in Hedge-Fund Returns,” Journal of Fi-
nancial Economics 74, 3, 529–610.
Getmansky, M., Lo, A. and S. Mei, 2004, “Sifting Through the Wreckage:
Lessons from Recent Hedge-Fund Liquidations”, Journal of Investment
Management 2, 6–38.
Goetzmann, W., Ingresoll, J., Spiegel, M. and I. Welch, 2006, “Portfolio Per-
formance Manipulation and Manipulation-Proof Performance Measures”,
Yale University Working Paper. (Previous version of the paper (Sharpen-
ing Sharpe Ratios (2002))).
64Guidolin, M. and A., Timmermann, 2006, “International Asset Allocation un-
der Regime Switching, Skew and Kurtosis Preferences”, mimeo, Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper 2005-018A.
Gupta, A. and B. Liang, 2005, “Do Hedge Funds Have Enough Capital? A
Value at Risk Approach”, Journal of Financial Economics 77, 219–253.
Hamilton, J., 1989, “A New Approach to the Economic Analysis of Nonsta-
tionary Time Series and the Business Cycle”, Econometrica 57, 357–384.
Hansen, B. E, 1992, “The Likelihood Ratio Test Under Non-Standard Condi-
tions: Testing the Markov Switching Model of GNP”, Journal of Applied
Econometrics 7, 561-582.
Hutchinson, M. and L. Gallagher, 2005, “Convertible Bond Arbitrage”, Dublin
City University Working Paper.
Hwang, S. and S. Satchell, 2000, “The Disappearance of Style in U.S. Equity
Market”, Cass Business School Working Paper.
Li, Y. and H. Kazemi, 2006, “Conditional Performance of Hedge Funds: Evi-
dence from Daily Returns”, University of Massachusetts, Amherst Work-
ing Paper.
Kazemi, H. and T. Schneeweis, 2003, “Conditional Performance of Hedge
Funds”, University of Massachusetts, Amherst Working Paper.
Krolzig, H.-M., 1997, “Markov-Switching Vector Autoregressions. Modelling,
Statistical Inference and Application to Business Cycle Analysis”, Lec-
ture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, Volume 454, Berlin:
Springer.
Leroux, B. G., 1992, “Consistent Estimation of a Mixing Distribution”, Annals
of Statistics 20, 1350–60.
Longin, F. 2000, “From Value at Risk to Stress Testing”, Journal of Banking
and Finance 24, 1097–1130.
Longin, F. and B. Solnik, 2001, “Extreme Correlations of International Equity
Markets”, The Journal of Finance 56, 2, 649–676.
Mathur, I., Pettengill, G. N. and S. Sundaram, 1995, “The Conditional Rela-
tion between Beta and Returns”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis Vol. 30, 1, 101–116.
McFadded, P., 1974, “The Measure of Urban Travel Demand”, Journal of
Public Economics 303–328.
McLachlan, G. J., 1987, “On Bootstrapping the Likelihood Ratio Test Statistic
for the Number of Components in a Normal Mixture”, Applied Statistics
36, 318–24.
65Mitchell,M. and T. Pulvino, 2001, “Characteristics of Risk and Return in Risk
Arbitrage”, The Journal of Finance 56, 6, 2135-2175.
Poskitt, D. S. and Chung, S.-H., 1996, “Markov Chain Models, Time Series
Analysis and Extreme Value Theory”, Advances in Applied Probability 28,
405–25.
Psaradakis Z. and N. Spagnolo, 2003, “On the Determination of the Number
of Regimes in Markov Switching Autoregressive Models”, Journal of Time
Series Analysis Vol. 24, No. 2.
Sirri, E. and P. Tufano, 1998, “Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows”, The
Journal of Finance 53, 1589–1622.
Schneeweis, T., Karavas, V. and G. Georgiev, 2002, “Alternative Investments
in the Institutional Portfolio”, University of Massachusetts, Amherst Work-
ing Paper.
Sharpe, W. F., 1992, “Asset Allocation: Management Style and Performance
Measurement”, Journal of Portfolio Management 18, 2, 7–19.
Tiwari, A., 2006, “Investing in Mutual Funds with Regime Switching”, Uni-
versity of Iowa Working Paper.
Zhang, J. and Stine, R. A., 2001, “Autocovariance Structure of Markov Regime
Switching Models and Model Selection”, Journal of Time Series Analysis
22, 107–24.
66